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THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE ARE NOT FREE:  
WHY IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 230 OF 
THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
SHOULD BE EARNED AND NOT FREELY 
GIVEN  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Barbra is halfway through her freshman year away at college.1  As 
she attempts to adjust to her new surroundings on campus, hoping to 
make new friends to ease her transition, someone in her dorm informs 
her that she is featured on a website called JuicyCollegeDirt.com.  She 
enters her name into Google, and the first result is a link to a post on 
JuicyCollegeDirt.com, so she clicks the link and is directed to the 
particular post involving her.2  There, Barbra finds a picture of her with a 
caption—anonymously written—that states:  “Barbra Balaney has 
sexually transmitted diseases.”  Below the main post is a large thread of 
other anonymous comments, which include criticisms of her physical 
appearance, claims that she uses drugs, and allegations that she is 
sexually promiscuous and cheats on her significant other.  
In a panic, Barbra begins navigating the website in search of a way to 
contact the site and request removal of the false assertions.  She finds the 
site’s policy statement, which provides that, while malicious defamation 
of character may be grounds for removal, the site does not guarantee that 
it will remove the material upon request or that posts will be removed 
within a certain time frame.  In accordance with the site’s stated removal 
procedure, Barbra requests removal of the material; however, the site 
does not remove the posts.  Barbra wants redress for the harm to her 
reputation, but as a college student cannot afford the costs associated 
with litigation against anonymous posters on the Internet who are likely 
                                                 
1 This hypothetical is fictional and solely the work of the Author and is used to describe 
the legal issues presented in this Note. 
2 GOOGLE, www.google.com, (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).  Google.com is a search engine 
service that assists users in locating material on the Internet.  James Grimmelmann, The 
Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2007).  Anthony Ciolli explained that 
individuals use Google.com to harm others, stating: 
malicious individuals—knowing that their actions on the Internet may 
have real-life consequences for the intended target—have begun to 
“Google bomb” individuals by creating a large number of defamatory 
messages about the target that are likely to show up in search engines 
and be seen by prospective employers, dates, friends, and others. 
Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects:  The Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace 
of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 154 (2008). 
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judgment proof.3  Most importantly, Barbra wants the material removed 
so that when people—such as future employers—search her name, they 
are not directed to the posts.  Knowing that the website was in the best 
position to remove the material, but failed to do so, Barbra wants to sue 
the website.4  
The law as it stands today protects websites, such as the fictional 
JuicyCollegeDirt.com, from almost all lawsuits involving content posted 
by third parties; therefore, Barbra is left with no recourse for the damage 
to her reputation.5  Unfortunately, this situation is a reality for thousands 
of students across the country.6  Victims seeking removal of unlawful 
material are often left with no remedy because the posters are typically 
anonymous and section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”) immunizes Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) from almost all 
claims involving third-party material on the Internet.7  
                                                 
3 See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 
1131 (2011) (discussing obstacles for victims of Internet abuse, such as jurisdictional and 
financial issues).  “[M]any individual defendants may well be impecunious and, therefore, 
effectively judgment-proof.”  Id. 
4 See Brian C. McManus, Note, Rethinking Defamation Liability for Internet Service 
Providers, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 648 (2001) (explaining that victims of Internet 
defamation seldom obtain adequate relief from authors of the material; therefore, victims 
seek alternative types of liability).  Although Barbra is not in a financial position to litigate 
a claim, the website has a deep pocket, which makes litigation worth pursuing.  See id. at 
648–49 (“Deep-pocketed Internet Service Providers . . . who facilitate the dissemination of 
[defamatory] information, are the most logical source of relief when the authors are 
judgment proof.”). 
5 See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 726 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (Barker, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]hen an anonymous speaker is the defendant, if plaintiff is not allowed to 
learn the identity of the speaker, there is no other opportunity for relief.”); see also Jason C. 
Miller, Who’s Exposing John Doe?  Distinguishing Between Public and Private Figure Plaintiffs in 
Subpoenas to ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 229, 243 
(2008) (“The practical effect of [the] interpretations of section 230 of the CDA is to leave 
Internet defamation victims with no deep pocket to sue.”); Cara J. Ottenweller, Note, 
Cyberbullying:  The Interactive Playground Cries for a Clarification of the Communications 
Decency Act, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2007) (explaining that discovering the identity of 
the individual responsible for the harmful material is challenging because Internet users 
are cloaked with anonymity). 
6 See Kimberly Quon, Note, Implementing a Standard of Care to Provide Protection from a 
Lawless Internet, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 589, 614 (2010) (stating that attacks on the Internet 
have become an epidemic (citing Ben Leichtling, Federal Laws Needed to Stop Cyber Bullying, 
Harassment and Abuse, BLOGGER NEWS NETWORK (July 8, 2009), http://www.bloggernews. 
net/121515)). 
7 See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the current law related to ISP liability and defamatory 
anonymous posts on the Internet).  The definition of ISP includes “entities that host 
websites, and entities that host message boards, auction sites, e-mail listservs, and Internet 
dating services.”  KrisAnn Norby-Jahner, Comment, “Minor” Online Sexual Harassment and 
the CDA § 230 Defense:  New Directions for Internet Service Provider Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 207, 230 (2009). 
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Individuals may not be able to prevent situations like the one 
described above, but the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
may alleviate the unfortunate effects such situations may have on 
students by creating a division that would serve as a neutral 
intermediary between the interests of individuals requesting removal of 
defamatory statements, the posting individuals’ freedom of speech, and 
the ISPs’ interests.8  Absent such a division, individuals like Barbra may 
be left emotionally, personally, and professionally damaged by 
anonymous postings on the Internet.  
This Note encourages the FCC to create a new division to serve as a 
neutral intermediary that evaluates claims made by potentially defamed 
individuals and determines whether ISPs should be required to remove 
particular postings.9  Before discussing this proposal, Part II provides a 
brief history of defamation law and the distinctions that exist in the 
characteristics of defamation law between traditional mediums of 
expression and the Internet.10  Next, Part III analyzes whether victims of 
Internet defamation have adequate methods to protect their 
reputations.11  Finally, Part IV proposes a formal removal procedure 
initiated by a victim of defamation through a neutral division of the FCC 
that ISPs must abide by to earn immunity from lawsuits concerning 
third-party content.12 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Internet is a medium unlike any before, allowing for instant 
communication that can be accessed by anyone anywhere.13  If harm 
                                                 
8 See infra Part IV.B (advocating for a notice-and-takedown procedure involving the 
FCC and explaining why it is superior to other alternatives). 
9 See infra Part IV (advocating for a notice-and-takedown procedure that respects each 
party’s interests). 
10 See infra Part II (discussing the common law categories of liability and how section 230 
and its judicial construction have exempted the Internet medium from such liability). 
11 See infra Part III (asserting that the law, as it stands today, does not adequately protect 
Internet defamation victims’ interests and that remedies suggested by other academics do 
not adequately protect the interests of ISPs and publishers of material on the Internet). 
12 See infra Part IV (proposing a removal procedure in which the FCC acts as a neutral 
decision-making intermediary to ensure that truly unlawful material is removed upon 
notice and lawful speech is not chilled in the process). 
13 Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV. 41, 45 
(1998).  The Internet has become a major mode of transaction and communication today.  
See Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility?:  Lessons from the 
DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 238 (2007) (referring 
to the Internet as “the heart and soul of global culture and society”); Ryan D. O’Day, Note, 
Rapists, Sexual Offenders, and Child Molesters:  Who Is Your Romantic Match?  Why Dating 
Websites Should Perform Criminal Background Checks, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 329, 341–42 (2013) 
(discussing the evolution of the internet and the many ways in which people use the 
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occurs, it is no longer exposed solely to a school or the local community; 
rather, the damaging material is broadcasted worldwide and can be 
accessed at all times, often causing more harm than ever imaginable.14  
                                                                                                             
internet today); Quon, supra note 6, at 605 (providing statistics regarding Internet 
transactions).  Notably, 78.6% of the North American population uses the Internet today.  
Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/ 
stats.htm (last updated Aug. 28, 2013).  This is no surprise, as popular websites, such as 
Facebook and YouTube have made it easier for individuals to express themselves 
creatively and instantly communicate with others miles away.  See Ryan M. Hubbard, Note, 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Communications Decency Act, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 345, 346 (discussing various websites that have become very influential).  
Facebook.com is a social networking site that allows individuals to communicate with 
others and create profiles that include personal information.  FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2013); see Richard M. Guo, Note, Stranger 
Danger and the Online Social Network, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 622–23 (2008) (describing 
Facebook.com and how it operates).  See also Lumturije Akiti, Note, Facebook Off Limts?  
Protecting Teachers’ Private Speech on Social Networking Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 122–23 
(2012) (indicating that Facebook reached 750 million users worldwide in 2011).  
YouTube.com is a website that permits individuals to upload video clips for the public to 
view.  YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
14 See Stacy M. Chaffin, Comment, The New Playground Bullies of Cyberspace:  Online Peer 
Sexual Harassment, 51 HOW. L.J. 773, 773 (2008) (explaining that, when the author was 
younger and got bullied, she was able to escape it by going home but that children today 
have no escape because when they get home they get bullied on the Internet); see also David 
A. Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet:  A Case Study of Cyber 
Targeting, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 667, 667 (2006) (describing the Internet as “quiescent 
anarchy” and asserting that it “often leaves victims in its wake”).  For example, today 
college students can and often do utilize gossip websites, such as CollegiateACB.com and 
TheDirty.com, to anonymously post harmful statements about others. COLLEGIATEACB, 
http://www.collegiateacb.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); THE DIRTY, 
http://www.thedirty.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); see Michael Burke, Note, Cracks in the 
Armor?:  The Future of the Communications Decency Act and Potential Challenges to the 
Protections of Section 230 to Gossip Web Sites, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 232, 255 (2011) (“[T]he 
operators of anonymous gossip board sites are often aware and even encourage third 
parties to post content that may be defamatory.”).  Although there is a wide variety of 
college gossip sites, there are some features common to all of them such as implicit and 
explicit encouragement of individuals to anonymously provide sensitive information about 
their peers with a disregard for the validity of the messages.  See Patricia Sanchez Abril, 
Repu-Taint Sites and the Limits of § 230 Immunity, J. INTERNET L., Jan. 2009, at 3, 3–4 
(describing “repu-taint” sites and commonalities among them).  For example, 
TheDirty.com, a website in which individuals can anonymously provide “dirt” on others, 
encourages gossip through its name alone.  THE DIRTY, supra.  Although the trend has been 
that these websites eventually shut down, they are replaced shortly thereafter by other 
websites with almost identical features and defamation issues. Burke, supra, at 254–55.  For 
example, after JuicyCampus.com shut down in 2009, supposedly due to lack of advertising, 
anyone who tried to access the site was redirected to CollegeACB.com, which consisted of 
the same types of posts.  Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet:  Balancing First 
Amendment Interests, Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking 
Sites, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 176, 177 (2009); see Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Note, Immoral 
Immunity:  Using a Totality of the Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1319–20 (2010) (discussing 
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Factors, such as the ease of access and the cloak of anonymity make the 
Internet particularly susceptible to harmful speech such as defamation.15  
Therefore, Part II.A of this Note discusses defamation law and the 
interests involved in such claims.16  Subsequently, Part II.B addresses the 
common law theories of liability for entities carrying or republishing 
third-party content.17  Next, Part II.C explores section 230 of the CDA, its 
judicial interpretation, and how it altered the theories of liability for 
ISPs.18  Part II.D discusses recent case law criticizing section 230.19  Last, 
Part II.E investigates previously suggested remedies for assisting victims 
of Internet harm in mitigating the damage to their reputations.20 
                                                                                                             
JuicyCampus.com and how it operated).  CollegeACB.com remained in business until 2012 
when it too met its demise; however, soon thereafter an extremely similar site, 
CollegiateACB.com, came into being and is currently beginning to flourish on college 
campuses throughout the nation.  COLLEGIATEACB, supra (providing a list of over 200 
universities represented on the website and the number of posts and topics involving each 
respective university). 
15 See Paul Ehrlich, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401, 401 
(2002) (providing characteristics of the Internet responsible for a prevalence in harmful 
speech and discussing the problems related to regulating harmful speech in the Internet 
medium); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 385 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that anonymity “facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability”); 
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 336 
(2005) (“Cyberspace offers unscrupulous people an entirely new venue in which to conduct 
harmful activities without a significant chance of being identified, let alone punished.”); 
Matthew Altenberg, Comment, Playing the Mysterious Game of Online Love:  Examining an 
Emerging Trend of Limiting § 230 Immunity of the Communications Decency Act and the Effects 
on E-Dating Websites, 32 PACE L. REV. 922, 941 (2012) (“The concept behind the Internet has 
been to facilitate unrestricted conversations between actors with little regulation or 
oversight.  Therefore, this environment is conditioned for deception, rumors, slander, and 
intentional misrepresentations involving real humans and imaginary humans.” (footnote 
omitted)); Sarah Jameson, Comment, Cyberharassment:  Striking a Balance Between Free Speech 
and Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 239 (2008) (asserting that, with less 
accountability, individuals are more likely to act in an unsavory manner). 
16 See infra Part II.A (discussing the First Amendment interests involved with 
defamation and online speech). 
17 See infra Part II.B (exploring the various theories of common law liability for entities 
re-publishing third-party content and the rationale for each theory). 
18 See infra Part II.C (explaining that the CDA and its broad judicial construction have 
eliminated the common law theories of liability for most claims involving re-publishing of 
third-party content on the Internet). 
19 See infra Part II.D (discussing concerns the judiciary has recently expressed regarding 
section 230’s broad construction, including concerns regarding the absence of a takedown 
procedure). 
20 See infra Part II.E (examining previous suggestions, such as using self-help remedies, 
amending section 230, and repealing section 230 altogether). 
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A. Defamation and the First Amendment Interests at Stake 
Defamation is the cause of action most commonly associated with 
section 230 of the CDA.21  Defamation law has been referred to as a “tug-
of-war” between two fundamental rights—the plaintiff’s right to her 
reputation and a defendant’s First Amendment right to free speech.22  
The First Amendment to the Constitution protects, among other things, 
an individual’s right to speak freely or to refrain from speaking at all.23  
In discussing First Amendment protection, the United States Supreme 
Court has indicated that it “accords greater weight to the value of free 
speech than to the dangers of its misuse.”24  The main theory behind 
broad free speech protection is that in a society where all types of speech 
contribute to the market place of ideas, the truth will be unveiled.25  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the freedom to publish 
anonymously is within the First Amendment’s free speech protections.26  
                                                 
21 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that it is not 
surprising that “[t]he cause of action most frequently associated with the cases on section 
230 is defamation” because section 230 was enacted in response to a defamation case); see, 
e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com., Inc., 
339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 
1997); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 2011); see also 
Altenberg, supra note 15, at 929 (explaining that the most common type of claims involving 
section 230 “are speech based torts, such as misrepresentation and defamation”); Joshua 
Dubnow, Comment, Ensuring Innovation as the Internet Matures:  Competing Interpretations of 
the Intellectual Property Exception to the Communications Decency Act Immunity, 9 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 297, 297 (2010) (“Because much of what is written in blogs and on message 
boards is done anonymously, internet services and websites have quickly garnered 
negative and defamatory postings about individual non-public people.”).  It is important to 
note, however, that the scope of the law covers a wide variety of causes of action, which 
will be discussed in more depth in Part II.C.2. 
22 Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 239; see Amanda Groover Hyland, The Taming of 
the Internet:  A New Approach [to] Third-Party Internet Defamation, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 79, 109–10 (2008) (discussing the First Amendment interests at stake in Internet 
defamation cases involving section 230). 
23 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding that the state could not punish 
citizens for refusing to display the motto “live free or die” on their license plates).  
Specifically, the First Amendment states, in part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Supreme Court has made 
clear that the First Amendment’s protections extend wholly to communications on the 
Internet.  Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
24 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citing Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
25 See Hyland, supra note 22, at 110–11 (discussing the marketplace of ideas theory). 
26 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199–200 (1999); 
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (“[A]n author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other 
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of 
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 
60, 64–65 (1960); see also Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Ct. App. 2008) 
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The Court has reasoned that “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of 
the majority,” allowing more information to enter the market place of 
ideas because it protects individuals from retaliation for disseminating 
information that society may not agree with.27  Therefore, courts have 
carefully preserved Internet users’ right to speak anonymously.28  As a 
result, ISPs are not required to disclose anonymous posters’ identities, 
and individuals seeking the identities of anonymous authors of online 
speech often have to obtain court orders to compel the release of such 
information.29  
Although the Supreme Court has indicated that it greatly values free 
speech, the Court has also indicated that the First Amendment right to 
                                                                                                             
(“Judicial recognition of the constitutional right to publish anonymously is a longstanding 
tradition.”).  The Court has come to the conclusion that the framers intended to protect 
anonymous speech because the Federalist Papers were published under fictitious names, so 
anonymous publication traces back to the actual ratification of the U.S. Constitution.  
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342; Miller, supra note 5, at 248–49 (“[T]he Court recognized a long 
history of anonymous speech in this country (going back to the Federalist Papers) and 
afforded such speech constitutional protection.”).  In McIntyre, the Court held that a statute 
prohibiting anonymous distribution of campaign literature violated the First Amendment.  
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357. 
27 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342, 357.  The Court further asserted that anonymity “provides a 
way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge 
her message simply because they do not like its proponent.”  Id. at 342.  Additionally, the 
Court provided examples of well-known writers that wrote under pseudonyms, noting 
that “[g]reat works of literature have frequently been produced by authors writing under 
assumed names.”  Id. at 341 & n.4 (explaining that Mark Twain’s name is actually Samuel 
Langhorne Clemens and Voltaire’s name is Francois Marie Arouet). 
28 See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (asserting that a 
plaintiff seeking to compel disclosure of an individual’s identity must be subject to a higher 
standard because the order would constitute a mandatory injunction, and “an unmasked 
anonymous speaker cannot later obtain relief from the order should the party seeking the 
speaker’s identity not prevail on the merits of the lawsuit”); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241 
(stating that some courts have exercised heightened scrutiny of a plaintiff’s claim prior to 
disclosure of a speaker’s identity (citing Dendrite Int’l., Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001))).  Although the right to speak anonymously is carefully 
preserved, courts have varied regarding the applicable standard for compelling disclosure.  
See Erik P. Lewis, Note, Unmasking “Anon12345”:  Applying an Appropriate Standard When 
Private Citizens Seek the Identity of Anonymous Internet Defamation Defendants, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 947, 954–57 (discussing the variety of standards courts have adopted, such as the 
motion to dismiss standard, the summary judgment standard, and the good faith 
standard); see also, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460–61 (Del. 2005) (adopting a two-part 
summary judgment standard); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 (articulating a four-step process 
that has been termed the motion to dismiss standard). 
29 Kraig J. Marton et al., Protecting One’s Reputation—How to Clear a Name in a World 
Where Name Calling Is So Easy, 4 PHOENIX L. REV. 53, 61 (2010); see Miller, supra note 5, at 
248–50 (discussing the process and challenges involved with John Doe suits seeking to 
compel ISPs to disclose identities). 
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free speech is not absolute.30  Notably, the First Amendment does not 
protect defamatory speech to the same degree as most other speech 
because the Court does not consider defamatory speech valuable in the 
marketplace of ideas.31  The Restatement (Second) of Torts has defined 
defamation as a communication that tends “to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter 
third persons from associating or dealing with him.”32  Although 
defamation laws vary depending on the state, a plaintiff alleging 
defamation typically must establish the following:  “(a) a false and 
defamatory statement . . . ; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third 
party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the 
publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of 
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the 
publication.”33  The extent of liability imposed on an entity that 
                                                 
30 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (citing cases in which the First 
Amendment has permitted the imposition of limitations on speech); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is 
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”). 
31 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (specifying categories of speech that do not raise 
constitutional concerns, such as “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or ‘fighting’ words”).  While defamation is not protected to the same degree as 
most other categories of speech, it is not completely unprotected.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that, to recover for defamation, public 
officials must prove that the publisher acted with actual malice); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 580A (1977) (adopting the actual malice standard for public figures).  The 
rationale for the imposition of a higher burden of proof on public figures is that public 
figures have greater access to channels of communication and thus, have a greater 
opportunity to minimize the effects of the defamatory communication than private 
individuals do.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining defamation and providing 
types of disparagement that rise to the level of actionable defamation).  There are two types 
of defamation:  libel and slander.  Id. § 568; see Marton et al., supra note 29, at 55 
(recognizing that libel was established overtime after courts determined slander failed to 
adequately encompass the entire defamation tort).  Libel is the publication of defamatory 
matter through written or printed words; whereas, slander is the publication of defamatory 
matter through spoken words.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977).  However, 
the distinction between the two causes of action rarely matters; therefore, most courts 
generally refer to the cause of action as defamation, regardless of whether it is written or 
spoken.  Marton et al., supra note 29, at 55–56. 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).  Regarding element (d), a statement 
can constitute actionable defamation without proof of damages in some limited situations.  
See, e.g., id. § 571 (asserting the standard for imputations of criminal conduct); id. § 572 
(explaining the rule for imputations of loathsome disease and specifying that “[o]ne who 
publishes a slander that imputes to another an existing venereal disease or other loathsome 
and communicable disease is subject to liability without proof of special harm”); id. § 573 
(providing the rule for imputations affecting business, trade, or profession and explaining 
that “[o]ne who publishes a slander that ascribes to another conduct, characteristics or a 
condition that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of his lawful 
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republishes defamatory third-party content varies depending on the 
medium used to transmit the information because, while most mediums 
are subject to the common law framework, the CDA exempted the 
Internet medium from the common law analysis.34  As a result, it is 
instructive to gain an understanding of the common law framework that 
is applied to non-Internet mediums.35 
B. Common Law Framework 
To better understand the application of section 230, one must gain an 
adequate basis of the common law approach in assessing liability for 
third-party content.  The common law framework focuses on the degree 
of editorial control that the entity exercises over the material at issue.36  
                                                                                                             
business, trade or profession, or of his public or private office . . . is subject to liability 
without proof of special harm”); id. § 574 (“One who publishes a slander that imputes 
serious sexual misconduct to another is subject to liability to the other without proof of 
special harm.”).  Section 571 states: 
One who publishes a slander that imputes to another conduct 
constituting a criminal offense is subject to liability to the other 
without proof of special harm if the offense imputed is of a type which, 
if committed in the place of publication, would be  
(a) punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution, 
or  
(b regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude. 
Id. § 571. 
34 Dubnow, supra note 21, at 300–01 (“Congress made a ‘policy choice by providing 
immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in 
making available content prepared by others.’” (quoting Robert T. Langdon, Note, The 
Communications Decency Act § 230:  Make Sense?  Or Nonsense?—A Private Person’s Inability to 
Recover if Defamed in Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 829, 852 (1999))); see Batzel v. Smith, 
333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Congress chose to treat the Internet 
different from other mediums of communication).  Several academics have taken issue 
with the advantage websites have gained over traditional print media.  See, e.g., Medenica 
& Wahab, supra note 13, at 264–65 (suggesting that the distinction is not warranted because 
the harm suffered is the same regardless of the medium used to impose the harm); David 
R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 149–50 (1997) (discussing the 
distinction between legal treatment of printed letters to an editor and electronic letters to an 
editor); Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism?  Why Traditional Defamation 
Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1457 (2006) (criticizing the 
“artificial distinction” section 230 created between the Internet and traditional print 
mediums). 
35 See infra Part II.B (exploring the three common law categories of entities involved in 
assessing liability for third-party content). 
36 Matthew G. Jeweler, The Communications Decency Act of 1996:  Why § 230 is Outdated 
and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet Service Providers, 
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2007, at 1, 5; see Ryan French, Comment, Picking Up the Pieces:  
Finding Unity After the Communications Decency Act Section 230 Jurisprudential Clash, 72 LA. 
L. REV. 443, 453 (2012) (stating that the distinction between each type of common law 
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The burden a plaintiff must satisfy to succeed in a suit against an entity 
that disseminates third-party content depends on whether the entity’s 
status is that of a common carrier, publisher, or distributor.37    
A common carrier passively provides a forum for third-party speech 
without editorial control; therefore, it is not liable for information it 
transmits.38  In contrast, a publisher exercises editorial control over the 
third-party information and thus is subject to liability for the content of 
the speech.39  Distributors, such as libraries, are held liable only upon a 
plaintiff’s showing that the distributors had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the unlawful nature of the material.40  Distributors are 
                                                                                                             
liability depends on the degree of knowledge each type of entity has regarding the material 
at issue); Brian J. McBrearty, Comment, Who’s Responsible?  Website Immunity Under the 
Communications Decency Act and the Partial Creation or Development of Online Content, 82 
TEMP. L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) (“The distinction between publishers and distributors under 
the common law recognizes that increased control over content begets increased exposure 
to liability.”); Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party 
Internet Defamation Claims:  How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 656 (2002) 
(“The duty of care and liability increases as the discretion that the disseminator has over 
the published information increases.”). 
37 Jeweler, supra note 36, at 3–4 (citing Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet 
Service Provider for Internet or E–mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 169, 177 (2000)); see Colby 
Ferris, Student Article, Communication Indecency:  Why the Communications Decency Act, and 
the Judicial Interpretation of It, Has Led to a Lawless Internet in the Area of Defamation, 14 BARRY 
L. REV. 123, 123–26 (2010) (discussing the common law theories of liability and providing 
examples of each); Ryan Gerdes, Note, Scaling Back § 230 Immunity:  Why the 
Communications Decency Act Should Take a Page from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s 
Service Provider Immunity Playbook, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 653, 656–57 (2012) (explaining the 
rationale behind each type of entity’s common law liability); Troiano, supra note 34, at 1453 
(describing the three common law theories of liability for entities that publish third-party 
content). 
38 See Bryan J. Davis, Comment, Comment:  Untangling the “Publisher” Versus “Information 
Content Provider” Paradox of 47 U.S.C. § 230:  Toward a Rational Application of the 
Communications Decency Act in Defamation Suits Against Internet Service Providers, 32 N.M. L. 
REV. 75, 79–80 (explaining the rationale for the common carrier standard of liability); 
Jeweler, supra note 36, at 3–4 (“A common carrier has no editorial control over the 
information it carries, such as a telephone company, which has no control over the content 
of the calls that pass through it.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. f 
(1977) (discussing the type of liability applicable to a party responsible for the transmission 
of third-party messages); RICHARD A. SPINELLO, REGULATING CYBERSPACE 135 (2002) 
(discussing common carrier liability). 
39 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, 810 (5th 
ed. 1984); see Sheridan, supra note 34, at 168 (explaining the similarities and distinguishing 
factors between publishers and distributors); French, supra note 36, at 452–53 (describing 
and providing examples of publishers); Hattie Harman, Note, Drop-Down Lists and the 
Communications Decency Act:  A Creation Conundrum, 43 IND. L. REV. 143, 146 (2009) 
(discussing common law publisher liability). 
40 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The 
requirement that a distributor must have knowledge of the contents of a publication before 
liability can be imposed for distributing that publication is deeply rooted in the First 
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subject to limited liability due to concerns that it would be too 
burdensome for them to read every publication prior to sale or 
distribution and that liability would result in excessive censorship.41  
While almost all providers of third-party content are subject to liability 
depending on the above categories, Congress, through the CDA, has 
made the Internet an exception.42 
C. Section 230 of the CDA:  How It Came to Be and What It Has Become 
Section 230 of the CDA protects ISPs from incurring liability for 
third-party content on the Internet.43  The statute’s language contains 
some ambiguities; therefore, the judiciary has attempted to discern 
Congress’s intentions, interpreting section 230 accordingly.44  Part II.C.1 
                                                                                                             
Amendment . . . .”); Jeweler, supra note 36, at 4; see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152–55 
(1959) (invalidating an ordinance that imposed liability on booksellers for possession of 
obscene books despite booksellers lacking knowledge as to the books’ contents); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. e. (1977) (adopting the distributor standard of 
liability for bookstores and libraries).  
41 Smith, 361 U.S. at 153–54.  Some examples of distributors are libraries, newsstands, 
and booksellers.  See French, supra note 36, at 53 (discussing and providing examples of 
distributors). 
42 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) (“There is no reason inherent in 
the technological features of cyberspace why . . . [the] law should apply differently in 
cyberspace than in the brick and mortar world.  Congress, however, has chosen for policy 
reasons to immunize from liability for defamatory or obscene speech ‘providers and users 
of interactive computer services’ when the defamatory or obscene material is ‘provided’ by 
someone else.”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Internet publishers are treated differently from corresponding publishers in print, 
television and radio.”). 
43 Peter Adamo, Comment, Craigslist, the CDA, and Inconsistent International Standards 
Regarding Liability for Third-Party Postings on the Internet, PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE 
COMPANION, Feb. 2011, at 1, 2; Emily K. Fritts, Note, Internet Libel and the Communications 
Decency Act:  How the Courts Erroneously Interpreted Congressional Intent with Regard to 
Liability of Internet Service Providers, 93 KY. L.J. 765, 773 (2004–2005). 
44 Eric Weslander, Comment, Murky “Development”:  How the Ninth Circuit Exposed 
Ambiguity Within the Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should Worry 
[Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 284 (2008).  Because courts have had to interpret much of 
section 230, it is important to note the methods courts generally use to interpret statutes.  
See id. (explaining that, because section 230 is ambiguous, “a debate rages” regarding what 
Congress actually intended).  There are three levels of analysis involved in the traditional 
approach to statutory interpretation, each seeking to discern the legislature’s intent and 
meaning regarding the statute.  See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 353–58 (discussing 
approaches to statutory interpretation and analyzing how each approach works).  First, a 
court will look directly at “the text and context of the statutory provision.”  Id. at 353.  If the 
intent is unclear from the provision’s text, the court will consider its legislative history.  Id.  
If the legislative history fails to provide an answer as to the legislature’s intent, courts may 
consider canons of statutory interpretation.  Id.  “[C]anons are general rules created by the 
judiciary in an attempt to provide uniform guidelines by which a statute can be interpreted 
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discusses section 230’s legislative history.45  Next, Part II.C.2 explores 
how courts have interpreted section 230.46 
1. The Legislative History of Section 230 of the CDA   
Congress enacted section 230 the CDA as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.47  Soon after a Time Magazine cover 
story brought attention to the large array of offensive material on the 
Internet, Senator Exon introduced a draft of section 223 of the CDA in an 
effort to protect children from sexually explicit content.48  While Senator 
                                                                                                             
in the absence of any more concrete guidance or authority on point.”  Id. at 357.  One 
notable canon is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which stands for the proposition that, 
when certain terms have been explicitly stated in a statute, it may be implied that the 
statute is inapplicable to terms that have been excluded from the legislation.  73 AM. JUR. 
2D Statutes § 120 (2012).  Another canon is in pari materia, which provides that, when two or 
more parts of a statute concern the same subject, they must be “construed together so that 
all parts of the statutory scheme are given effect.”  Id. § 95.  Similarly, it is important to 
consider the rule against surplusage.  See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 88 (2009) (describing the rule against surplusage); see also 
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (criticizing the concurrence for violating 
“the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be 
entirely redundant” (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979); Jarecki v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307–08 (1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–539 
(1955))); Gregory M. Dickinson, Note, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 869–70 
(2010) (discussing the rule against surplusage and its applicability to section 230 of the 
CDA).  The rule against surplusage provides that, “if an interpretation of given statutory 
words would produce a meaning that was duplicative of other statutory language, it is 
presumed that this is not the correct interpretation.”  CROSS, supra. 
45 See infra Part II.C.1 (explaining Congress’s motivation for enacting section 230 of the 
CDA). 
46 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the judiciary’s broad construction of section 230 of the 
CDA and its reasons for doing so). 
47 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026; Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 246–47.  The CDA was 
part of an overall amendment to the Communications Act of 1934.  David S. Ardia, Free 
Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels:  An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 409 (2010). 
48 See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency 
Act:  Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 57 (1996) 
(“The fundamental purpose of the Communications Decency Act is to provide much 
needed protection for children.” (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995))).  
Time Magazine featured a front page exclusive of a pornography study (“Rimm study”) 
performed by a Carnegie Mellon University researcher named Marty Rimm.  Id. at 53–54 
(citing Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway:  A Survey of 
917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by 
Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849 
(1995)).  In his study, Rimm asserted that pornographic images comprised 83.5% of the 
images on the Internet.  Rimm, supra, at 1867; see Cannon, supra, at 54–57 (providing 
background on the Rimm study and explaining the study’s involvement in the CDA’s 
legislative history).  The Rimm study was heavily criticized, and Time Magazine even 
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Exon’s ultimate goal was uncontested, his method of achieving that 
goal—namely through FCC regulation—was not well received by some 
Congressmen.49  Specifically, Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron 
Wyden introduced the Online Family Empowerment Act (“Cox-Wyden 
Amendment”), which was a defensive provision expressly rejecting FCC 
interference.50  Although juvenile access to pornography was the initial 
issue Congress sought to address, the Cox-Wyden Amendment tackled 
several other concerns that Congressmen had with the emergence of the 
Internet—such as two recent court applications of traditional defamation 
law to the Internet, which disincentivised removal of offensive 
material.51  
                                                                                                             
published a follow-up article that one scholar has considered “all but a retraction and 
apology for being duped into publishing the study.”  Cannon, supra, at 55–56 (discussing 
the problems related to the Rimm study, such as the lack of peer review, plagiarism, and 
allegations of ethical violations).  In support of his draft of the CDA, Senator Exon also 
introduced, and often cited to, his “blue book,” which was a folder containing 
pornographic material that was accessible to children via the Internet.  David Lukmire, 
Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?:  The Reverberations of Zeran v. 
America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 374 (2010).  He sought to keep the 
Internet from becoming a “red light district.” Ardia, supra note 47, at 409–10. 
49 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Christopher 
Cox).  The FCC is an independent federal government agency that regulates national and 
international communications by methods, such as radio, television, satellite, and cable.  
What We Do, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 
26, 2013).  It was created by Congress under the Communications Act of 1934, and 
Congress continues to oversee the agency today.  Id.  On its website, the FCC states that its 
work involves the following: 
[p]romoting competition, innovation, and investment in broadband 
services and facilities; [s]upporting the nation’s economy by ensuring 
an appropriate competitive framework for the unfolding of the 
communications revolution; [e]ncouraging the highest and best use of 
spectrum domestically and internationally; [r]evising media 
regulations so that new technologies flourish alongside diversity and 
localism; [p]roviding leadership in strengthening the defense of the 
nation’s communications infrastructure. 
Id.  The FCC is composed of offices and bureaus that implement regulatory programs, 
encourage the development of innovative services, and investigate and analyze complaints.  
Id. 
50 141 CONG. REC. H8468–69.  The proposed Cox-Wyden Amendment had a section 
entitled “FCC Regulation of the Internet and other Interactive Computer Services 
Prohibited.”  Id. at H8469.  Representative Wyden emphasized that, “parents and families 
are better suited to guard the portals of cyberspace and protect our children than our 
Government bureaucrats.”  Id. at H8470.  He then proceeded to show his fellow 
Congressmen a few pieces of emerging technology that enabled parents to block 
pornography on their children’s computers, arguing that the private sector should solve 
the problem rather than the Government.  Id. 
51 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70; see Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (classifying CompuServe as a distributor and granting it summary 
judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding what 
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First, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., a New York district court held 
that ISP CompuServe was not liable for a third party’s defamatory 
statement, reasoning that it was a mere distributor that did not exercise 
editorial control over the material or have actual or constructive 
knowledge of its defamatory nature.52  In contrast, the Supreme Court of 
New York held an ISP liable for a third party’s defamatory statements in 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., reasoning that the ISP was 
subject to publisher liability because it filtered the content in efforts to 
block obscenity from its network.53  The Stratton court distinguished 
Prodigy from CompuServe, explaining that Prodigy’s “conscious choice, 
to gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater 
liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that make no 
such choice.”54  Hence, the Stratton court inadvertently encouraged ISPs 
to refrain from self-regulating to avoid liability.55  
                                                                                                             
“CompuServe knew or had reason to know” about the alleged defamatory statements); 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995) (holding that making decisions that control the content on internet bulletin boards 
constitutes editorial control which opened the defendant up to greater liability), superseded 
by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); see also Mark G. Materna, Protecting Generation Z:  A Brief 
Policy Argument Advocating Vicarious Liability for Internet Service Providers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 
109, 112 (2012) (discussing Congress’s intent in enacting section 230 and stating that 
“Congress was prompted by two New York state court decisions that reached markedly 
different conclusions”). 
52 776 F. Supp. at 141.  In Cubby, developers of a computer database for online gossip 
filed a defamation suit against an ISP for allowing allegedly defamatory material written 
by a competitor to appear on one of the ISP’s forums.  Id. at 138.  Notably, CompuServe 
contracted management duties for the forum’s content to an independent company and did 
not have the opportunity to review the contents of the publication prior to its release.  Id. at 
137. 
53 1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (“By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete 
notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad taste’, for 
example, PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to content, and such decisions constitute 
editorial control.” (citation omitted)); see supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing 
common law publisher liability). 
54 Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.  The court emphasized that Prodigy presented itself to 
the public as having control over the content of its bulletin boards and that Prodigy 
implemented an automatic screening program to affect its control.  Id. at *4.  As for 
potential concerns, the court stated “the fear that this Court's finding of publisher status for 
[Prodigy] will compel all computer networks to abdicate control of their bulletin boards, 
incorrectly presumes that the market will refuse to compensate a network for its increased 
control and the resulting increased exposure.”  Id. at *5 (citing Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, 
the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas:  Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer 
Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 87, 138–39 (1993)). 
55 Hyland, supra note 22, at 98; Burke, supra note 14, at 239; Gerdes, supra note 37, at 659; 
see Charles F. Marshall & Eric M. David, Prior Restraint 2.0:  A Framework for Applying 
Section 230 to Online Journalism, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 75, 78 (2011) (“Internet 
companies found themselves in a seemingly untenable position—either take some role in 
controlling the content on their website and risk significant legal liability for content they 
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The Stratton decision laid the foundation for the Cox-Wyden 
Amendment, which eventually became section 230 of the final version of 
the CDA.56  The Congressmen sought to overturn Stratton and encourage 
ISPs to self-regulate by shielding “Good Samaritan” ISPs from liability.57  
Representative Cox stated that his Amendment would “protect 
computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who 
provides a front end to the Internet, . . . who takes steps to screen 
indecency and offensive material for their customers.”58  To determine 
whether section 230 has had the intended effect, one must consider both 
the language of the statute itself and the judiciary’s interpretation of that 
language.59 
2. Section 230 of the CDA and Its Broad Judicial Construction   
The Internet has undergone many changes since Congress passed 
section 230; therefore, courts have been left with the task of interpreting 
section 230’s scope and application to the always-emerging methods of 
                                                                                                             
did not write or take a wholly hands-off approach and lose all control over the content on 
their website.”).  As two scholars have noted: 
the liability rules were discouraging ISPs from attempting to filter 
problematic communications.  After all, an ISP that refused to self-
regulate was likely to fall under the Cubby analysis and be 
characterized as a passive, and hence virtually immune, distributor.  
An ISP that endeavored to filter, by contrast, was vulnerable to the 
Stratton Oakmont line of reasoning and its associated legal risks. 
Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 221, 250 (2006). 
56 See Lewis, supra note 28, at 958 (“Congress passed the CDA in response to the Stratton 
decision in 1995.”). 
57 141 CONG. REC. H1130 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (“One of the specific purposes of 
[section 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions 
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is 
not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”); Materna, 
supra note 51, at 114 (“Also paramount to Congress’s rationale in passing § 230 was that 
creating such immunity would subsequently remove disincentives for self-regulation of 
ISPs.”).  Additionally, the Congressmen sought to promote further development of the 
Internet.  Ardia, supra note 47, at 410.  However, several academics have contended that the 
Internet is robust enough today that it should be exposed to the same liability as traditional 
print mediums.  See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 44, at 874 (asserting that, because the 
Internet has flourished, “it no longer serves any coherent purpose to treat defamatory 
content in the print edition of the New York Times differently than that in the online 
version.”); Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal:  Defamation Liability 
for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 491 (2004) (questioning 
whether the Internet even needs protection from liability now that it “is no longer in its 
infancy”).  
58 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
59 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the judicial interpretation of section 230, which has 
been primarily broad). 
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communication the Internet provides.60  The portion of the statute that 
has prompted a great deal of litigation is section 230(c), which states: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker  
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
(2) Civil liability  
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of—  
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or   
(B) any action taken to enable or make available 
to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1).61  
                                                 
60 See Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 247 (“As the Internet took on increasing 
importance in the nation’s daily life, courts began to grapple with its implications.”). 
61 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); Ashley Ingber, Note, Cyber Crime Control:  Will Websites Ever 
Be Held Accountable for the Legal Activities They Profit From?, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 423, 
428 (2012) (“The language used by Congress in drafting Section 230 has led to a great deal 
of litigation about who Congress intended to protect.”). Section 230 is missing one major 
aspect of Cox and Wyden’s Amendment as originally introduced:  part of the section 
heading, “FCC Regulation of Computer Services Prohibited,” is conspicuously absent.  
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (providing the statutory language of section 230), with 141 
CONG. REC. H8468 (Aug. 4, 1995) (identifying Congress’s intent in passing section 230).  
Section 230(b) sets out the following underlying policies for the statute’s enactment: 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and 
other interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which 
maximize user control over what information is received by 
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other 
interactive computer services; 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict 
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Litigation has also occurred regarding the statute’s distinction 
between two types of ISPs:  interactive computer services (“ICS”) and 
information content providers (“ICP”).62  Notably, the judiciary has 
                                                                                                             
their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to 
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by 
means of computer. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b).  As for Senator Exon, his efforts produced section 223 of the CDA, which 
criminalized the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent materials to anyone less than 
eighteen years of age.  See id. § 223 (outlining the now current language of section 223).  
However, section 223 was instantly met with hostility, as twenty individuals filed suit 
challenging its constitutionality the day President Clinton signed it into law.  French, supra 
note 36, at 451.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court struck down section 223 as a violation of 
the First Amendment free speech clause in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.  521 U.S. 
844, 874, 879 (1997).  The Court reasoned that, while protecting minors from harmful 
speech is a valid government interest, section 223 of the CDA was not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to pass constitutional muster.  Id. at 875, 879.  The Court further explained that, in 
an effort to protect minors, section 223 of the CDA impermissibly suppressed speech that 
adults have a constitutional right to receive.  Id. at 874. 
62 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)–(3) (defining ICS and ICP); see also Ingber, supra note 61, at 428 
(contending that section 230 does not provide adequate assistance to courts in 
distinguishing between the two types of Internet entities).  To qualify for section 230 
immunity:  “(1) the defendant must be a provider or user of an ‘interactive computer 
service’; (2) the asserted claims must treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of 
information; and (3) the challenged communication must be ‘information provided by 
another information content provider.’”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003).  
Many courts have struggled in determining what types of acts would render an ISP a 
fellow content provider, precluding it from satisfying the third element.  See, e.g., Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166, 
1170 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ISP became an information content provider by 
requiring users to answer questions about discriminatory preferences as a condition of 
participating in its housing services); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (holding that the ISP’s acts of 
altering and publishing a defamatory e-mail from a user did not render the ISP an 
information content provider); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (asserting that, regardless of the editing decisions, an ISP cannot be considered 
an information content provider of third-party content); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. 
Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985–86 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the ISP’s act of deleting 
some information from the third-party post did not transform the ISP into an information 
content provider because it was merely engaging in traditional editorial functions).  Section 
230 defines ICS and ICP as: 
(2) Interactive computer service[:]   
 The term “interactive computer service” means any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and 
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions.   
(3) Information content provider[:]   
 The term “information content provider” means any person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
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typically interpreted section 230 very broadly, almost always granting 
immunity to ISPs.63  
Although the legislative history and text of section 230 suggests that 
the statute’s scope is narrow—applying only to defamation claims and 
good faith efforts to self-regulate—the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc. rejected such a narrow reading of the statute and instead 
broadly construed the scope of section 230’s immunity to apply to claims 
other than defamation.64  Additionally, the Zeran court rejected notice-
based liability, eviscerating the common law distinction between 
publishers and distributors.65  
In Zeran, an anonymous third party posted a message on an America 
Online (“AOL”) bulletin board advertising offensive t-shirts praising the 
Oklahoma City bombing and directing interested buyers to contact 
plaintiff Kenneth Zeran (“Zeran”).66  In response, Zeran notified AOL 
about the hoax, and an AOL employee assured Zeran that AOL would 
                                                                                                             
development of information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)–(3). 
63 See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 10 (asserting that courts have interpreted section 230’s 
immunity very broadly); Eric Taubel, Note, The ICS Three-Step:  A Procedural Alternative for 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and Derivative Liability in the Online Setting, 12 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 365, 366–67 (2011) (“Courts have interpreted [section 230’s] 
immunity in a broad and sweeping manner, making it nearly impossible for any plaintiff to 
successfully hold an ICS liable for the tortious behavior of a third party.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
64 See 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information 
originating with a third-party user of the service.” (emphasis added)); see also Lukmire, 
supra note 48, at 385 (asserting that the court’s interpretation in Zeran was unnecessarily 
broad). 
65 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332; see supra Part II.B (explaining that publishers and distributors 
are subject to different standards of liability for disseminating third-party content). 
66 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.  The advertisement included Zeran’s home telephone number, 
which he could not change because he relied on the home telephone number for his 
business.  Id.  The t-shirts had slogans, such as “‘Visit Oklahoma . . . It’s a BLAST!!!’” and 
“‘Finally a day care center that keeps the kids quiet—Oklahoma 1995.’”  Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 nn.3 & 5 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (1997).  The 
Oklahoma City Bombing occurred on April 19, 1995 and resulted in 168 deaths and more 
than 500 injured people.  STUART A. WRIGHT, PATRIOTS, POLITICS, AND THE OKLAHOMA 
CITY BOMBING 6 (2007).  The deadly explosion was caused by a homemade bomb, which 
was placed in the back of a truck that was parked in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building.  Id.  The bombing shocked the nation and was headline news for months not only 
because of the death toll, but also because it was the work of a domestic rather than foreign 
terrorist.  Id.  In fact, the perpetrator was a twenty-seven-year-old decorated Gulf War 
veteran with no previous criminal record, which was even more shocking.  Id. at 7.  As a 
result of the hoax, Zeran received numerous calls, which predominantly consisted of 
derogatory messages and even included death threats.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. 
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remove the post but refused to post a retraction.67  After the offensive 
advertisements continued to appear, Zeran filed suit seeking to hold 
AOL liable for the third party’s defamatory statements based on a theory 
of common law distributor liability.68  However, the court expressly 
rejected the possibility of holding ISPs liable under traditional 
distributor liability, explaining that distributor liability was a mere 
subset of publisher liability and was thus barred by section 230.69  In 
doing so, the court voiced its concerns that notice-based liability would 
chill speech because it would prompt ISPs to simply remove the material 
upon notice without engaging in a careful investigation as to whether the 
material was in fact defamatory.70  The court emphasized that decisions 
regarding “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content” fall 
                                                 
67 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.  The following day, another similar anonymous Oklahoma City 
Bombing-related t-shirt advertisement appeared, once again directing interested buyers to 
contact Zeran.  Id.  Additional anonymous advertisements of the same variety began to 
appear advertising items including bumper stickers and key chains, which still involved 
offensive Oklahoma City Bombing-related slogans.  Id.  Consequently, Zeran repeatedly 
called AOL and was informed by AOL’s representatives that the company would close the 
account from which the material was posted.  Id.  Notably, within five days of the initial 
advertisement, Zeran received a disgruntled phone call nearly every two minutes.  Id.  
Further exacerbating the issue, an Oklahome City radio station announcer relayed the 
content of the advertisements on air and urged his listeners to call Zeran’s phone number.  
Id. 
68 Id. at 331; see supra Part II.B (explaining the theory of distributor liability).  Zeran 
argued that, although section 230 immunized ISPs from liability as publishers, section 230’s 
immunity did not extend to AOL because it had knowledge of the defamatory content 
contained in the posts and thus, was subject to distributor liability.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
69 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.  Although the court recognized that liability varies depending 
on whether an entity is a distributor or publisher, it nonetheless determined that such 
differences still fall within the overall umbrella of publishers generally.  Id. (citing KEETON 
ET AL., supra note 39, at 803).  In doing so, the court stated: 
Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to 
disseminate the writings composed, the speeches made, and the 
information gathered by others may also be regarded as participating 
to such an extent in making the books, newspapers, magazines, and 
information available to others as to be regarded as publishers.  They 
are intentionally making the contents available to others, sometimes 
without knowing all of the contents—including the defamatory 
content—and sometimes without any opportunity to ascertain, in 
advance, that any defamatory matter was to be included in the matter 
published. 
Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, at 803). 
70 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see Lichtman & Posner, supra note 55, at 252 (“Because service 
providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not for 
its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon 
notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007–08 (2001) (asserting that a legal 
regime imposing liability on an ISP for its subscribers’ acts will cause the ISP to purge 
individuals who are liability risks from its system). 
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within a publisher’s traditional editorial functions and that lawsuits 
seeking to hold an ISP liable for any of those functions were barred by 
section 230, thereby expanding the scope of section 230 immunity.71  The 
decision and rationale in Zeran has played a prominent role in case law 
involving the CDA to date.72   
Shortly after Zeran, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia addressed section 230’s immunity in Blumenthal v. Drudge.73  
Despite finding that the ISP had exercised editorial control over the 
content of the material and that it would only be fair to hold the ISP 
liable as a distributor, the court, relying on Zeran, held that section 230 
immunized the ISP from suit.74  In its reluctant adherence to precedent, 
                                                 
71 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.  Zeran framed his claim as a negligence action; however, the 
court still determined that he was impermissibly seeking to hold AOL liable for traditional 
editorial functions of publishers.  See Shahrzad T. Radbod, Note, Craigslist—A Case for 
Criminal Liability for Online Service Providers?, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 597, 600 (2010) 
(discussing Zeran’s arguments to the court and why they were ineffective).  “Artful 
pleading did not take away from the fact that AOL assumed a role that Section 230 
specifically protected.”  Id.  
72 See Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 254 (“[T]he Zeran decision paved the way for 
ISPs, relying upon § 230 as a panacea, to ignore and even facilitate a variety of defamatory 
and sometimes egregious behaviors.”); Jennifer Benedict, Comment, Deafening Silence:  The 
Quest for a Remedy in Internet Defamation, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 475, 490 (2008–2009) (“Later 
cases rely on [Zeran’s] expansive interpretation in holding that § 230 proscribes the 
treatment of computer service providers as publishers for liability purposes.”); see also 
Bradford J. Sayler, Case Note, Amplifying Illegality:  Using the Exception to CDA Immunity 
Carved Out By Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com to Combat 
Abusive Editing Tactics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 203, 210 (2008) (asserting that in Zeran, “the 
Fourth Circuit established a trend of broad [section] 230 ICS immunity”); French, supra note 
36, at 457 (stating that, as of 2012, seven federal circuits had adopted Zeran’s broad 
interpretation of section 230 (citing Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010); Doe 
v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418–19 (1st Cir. 2007); Green v. Am Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 
2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. 
Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000))). 
73 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).  In Blumenthal, White House employees Sidney and 
Jacqueline Blumenthal brought a defamation suit against Matt Drudge and AOL after 
Drudge wrote and published an allegedly defamatory statement about them on his 
webpage entitled the Drudge Report.  Id. at 46–47.  Specifically, Drudge asserted that 
Sidney Blumenthal abused his wife.  Id. at 46.  The Blumenthals implicated AOL because 
when the alleged defamation occurred, AOL had a licensing agreement with Drudge, in 
which AOL compensated Drudge for making the Drudge Report available to AOL’s 
customers.  Id. at 47.  Pursuant to the licensing agreement, AOL paid Drudge $3000 each 
month for access to the Drudge Report.  Id.  The licensing agreement permitted Drudge to 
create, update, and otherwise manage the Drudge Report’s content; however, AOL 
reserved the right to remove content that did not comply with its standards.  Id. 
74 Id. at 51–53 (“Any attempt to distinguish between ‘publisher’ liability and notice-
based ‘distributor’ liability and to argue that Section 230 was only intended to immunize 
the former would be unavailing.”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/9
2013] The Best Things in Life Are Not Free 389 
the court declared that “[i]f it were writing on a clean slate, th[e] [c]ourt 
would agree with plaintiffs.”75    
In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit further expanded the scope of 
section 230’s immunity in two significant ways.  First, the court found 
that section 230’s immunity extended beyond just entities that provided 
access to the Internet as a whole, emphasizing that “interactive computer 
service” refers to “‘any’ information services or other systems, as long as 
the service or system allows ‘multiple users’ to access ‘a computer 
server.’”76  Second, the court determined that an entity does not forfeit its 
section 230 protection based on its editing decisions, unless the entity 
substantially alters the content at issue.77  The court in Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc. then interpreted section 230 even more liberally 
than in Batzel, finding that “so long as a third party willingly provides 
the essential published content,” the ISP is immune regardless of the 
editing or selection process involved.78  
                                                 
75 Id. at 51.  The court appeared to take issue with the fact that AOL took advantage of 
all the benefits that the CDA had to offer without accepting any of the burdens Congress 
intended; however, the court put aside its own opinion and adhered to precedent.  Id. at 
51–53.  One scholar has criticized the Blumenthal holding, arguing that it exemplifies a clear 
injustice, as there was absolutely no reason for AOL to have received section 230 immunity 
when it actively selected, published, and even publicized the defamatory material.  Jeweler, 
supra note 36, at 23. 
76 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030.  The court asserted that the language of section 230 confirmed 
its finding “that services providing access to the Internet as a whole are only a subset of the 
services to which the statutory immunity applies.”  Id.  In Batzel, handyman Robert Smith 
(“Smith”) claimed that he overheard Batzel remark that she was related to a former Nazi 
politician.  Id. at 1020–21.  Smith asserted that Batzel also informed him she was “‘the 
granddaughter of one of Adolf Hitler’s right hand men.’”  Id.  He also stated that, on 
another occasion, Batzel told him that she inherited a large number of paintings hanging on 
her wall, which to him looked old and European.  Id. at 1021.  As a result, Smith became 
suspicious that the paintings were stolen during World War II, so he e-mailed the Museum 
Security Network (“Network”) to report his suspicions.  Id.  Subsequently, the Network’s 
operator published Smith’s e-mail onto the Network’s website.  Id. at 1021–22.  Batzel filed 
suit disputing Smith’s version of their conversations and contending that Smith defamed 
her, not because he was genuinely suspicious about her art, but rather because Batzel 
refused to pass Smith’s screenplay to her Hollywood contacts.  Id. at 1022.  The court 
determined that the Network’s minor alterations to the e-mail were insufficient to render it 
an information content provider.  Id. at 1031. 
77 Id. (“The ‘development of information’ therefore means something more substantial 
than merely editing portions of an e-mail and selecting material for publication.”); see 
Marshall & David, supra note 55, at 82 (relying, in part, on Batzel to explain that “courts 
have . . . adopt[ed] a narrow view of information content provider”). 
78 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
ISP could not be considered an information content provider “because no profile has any 
content until a user actively creates it”).  In Carafano, an anonymous third-party created a 
Matchmaker.com profile of popular actress Christianne Carafano (“Carafano”).  Id. at 1121.  
The profile did not include Carafano’s name; however, it included two of her films, 
pictures of her, her home address, and an e-mail address, which when contacted, 
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Several courts, relying on Zeran, have repeatedly found that section 
230 immunity extends to ISPs that have been requested to remove 
unlawful material, but have refused or failed to do so.79  In Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., Cecilia Barnes became the victim of a cruel Internet prank 
when her ex-boyfriend created a profile online, which included her 
personal information, nude pictures taken of her without her knowledge, 
and open solicitations for sexual intercourse.80  After receiving several e-
mails, phone calls, and visits from unknown men expecting sex, Cecilia 
contacted Yahoo and informed it that she did not create the profile; 
however, Yahoo did not remove the profile despite repeated requests for 
it to do so.81  Months later, Yahoo’s Director of Communications notified 
Cecilia that she would personally make sure that the profile was 
removed.82  Despite the assurance, two more months passed, and Yahoo 
had still failed to remove the profile; therefore, Cecilia filed a lawsuit 
against Yahoo for its “negligent undertaking” in promising to remove 
the material and failing to do so properly.83  The Ninth Circuit held that 
section 230 shielded Yahoo from liability as to the negligent undertaking 
cause of action, reasoning that “removing content is something 
publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct 
                                                                                                             
automatically replied “’You think you are the right one?  Proof it !!’ [sic], and providing 
Carafano’s home address and telephone number.”  Id.  As a result, Carafano began 
receiving numerous calls, sexually explicit and threatening voicemail messages, and e-
mails.  Id. at 1121–22.  Consequently, she filed suit against Matchmaker.com alleging 
defamation, among other things.  Id. at 1122.  The court held that section 230 provided the 
ISPs immunity.  Id. at 1125. 
79 See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Friendfinder 
Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 296 (D.N.H 2008); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of 
N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 2011); see also McBrearty, supra note 36, at 835 
(stating that it is “well established that § 230(c) immunity extends to interactive computer 
services that refrain from taking any action with respect to offensive content”). 
80 570 F.3d at 1098. 
81 Id.  Barnes even mailed Yahoo a copy of her photo identification and signed a 
statement requesting the removal and denying having had any involvement with the 
profile.  Id. 
82 Id. at 1098–99.  Yahoo did so the day before “a local news program was preparing to 
broadcast a report on the incident.”  Id.  Relying on the assurance, Barnes took no further 
action in relation to the profiles.  Id. at 1099. 
83 Id.  Barnes argued that her claim did not treat Yahoo as a publisher because the source 
of the liability derived from the undertaking, not publishing functions.  Id. at 1102.  Barnes 
contended that, although Yahoo did not have an initial duty to remove the material, its 
agent undertook to do so, causing the duty to arise.  Id.  However, the court rejected 
Barnes’s argument, reasoning that the action still involved treating Yahoo as a publisher 
because the act that Yahoo allegedly undertook and failed to perform with due care was 
the removal of content, which is a publisher’s duty.  Id. at 1102–03. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/9
2013] The Best Things in Life Are Not Free 391 
necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the content 
it failed to remove.”84  
Section 230 also shielded an ISP from liability in Doe v. Friendfinder 
Network, Inc., where an unidentified third party created a profile on 
AdultFriendFinder.com using the plaintiff’s biographical data, birth 
date, descriptions of her appearance, a nude photograph, and 
information regarding her sexual proclivities.85  Despite the website’s 
assurances to the plaintiff that the profile would be removed, in the 
following months the profile began to appear as a teaser, with minor 
modifications, on the defendants’ other websites as well as Internet 
search engines and other third-party websites.86  As to the plaintiff’s state 
                                                 
84 Id. at 1103, 1105.  Despite the court’s holding as to the negligent undertaking claim, 
Barnes was not completely out of luck because the court subsequently held that Yahoo was 
not immune under a breach of contract theory.  Id. at 1109.  In doing so, the court 
distinguished the breach of contract claim, reasoning that “[p]romising is different because 
it is not synonymous with the performance of the action promised. . . . Contract liability 
here would come not from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest 
intention to be legally obligated to do something, which happens to be removal of material 
from publication.”  Id. at 1107.  Several scholars have criticized the court’s reasoning in 
distinguishing the contract-based liability from Barnes’s negligent undertaking claim.  See, 
e.g., Lukmire, supra note 48, at 402 (criticizing the holding’s facial inconsistency with the 
negligent undertaking portion of the opinion); Quon, supra note 6, at 608–09 (asserting that 
the court’s reasoning in Barnes was extremely unclear, vague, and prone to further attacks). 
Furthermore, critics argue that the Barnes court’s decision and reasoning will only result in 
an even more substantial disincentive for ISPs to self-regulate, which is contrary to 
Congress’s goal in enacting the statute.  See Abby R. Perer, Note, Policing the Virtual Red 
Light District:  A Legislative Solution to the Problems of Internet Prostitution and Sex Trafficking, 
77 BROOK. L. REV. 823, 834–35 (2012) (explaining that websites will avoid the Barnes holding 
by ignoring removal requests altogether and thus, preventing any possible formation of a 
contract or promissory estoppel claim); Quon, supra note 6, at 611 (“To any reasonable ISP, 
this approach would appear to create an even greater disincentive to self-regulate its online 
content . . . because any good faith action could potentially translate into a distinct and 
independent legal duty as recognized by the Barnes court’s take on a contract theory of 
recovery.”). 
85  540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292 (D.N.H 2008).  Adultfriendfinder.com describes itself as “the 
World’s Largest SEX and SWINGER Personal Community.”  Id. at 291.  To experience the 
website’s services, individuals had to register by entering a variety of personal information 
to create a profile that other members of the community could view.  Id.  The profile at 
issue in Friendfinder provided details that reasonably identified the plaintiff and stated that 
she was seeking “Men or Women for Erotic Chat/E-mail/Phone Fantasies and Discreet 
Relationship.”  Id. at 292 (footnote omitted). 
86 Id.  Specifically, search engines displayed the teasers when users entered search terms 
matching pieces of information in the profile, and third-party websites displayed the 
advertisements when a user was located “near the Upper Valley region of New 
Hampshire.”  Id. at 292–93.  The teasers directed Internet traffic to the defendants’ websites 
through hyperlinks.  Id. at 293.  Some of the advertisements even directed users to sexually 
related websites.  Id at 292.  The plaintiff alleged that the profile teaser deceived consumers 
into believing that, if they registered for the defendants’ dating website, they could meet 
her.  Id.  Additionally, the plaintiff took issue with the fact that the defendants did not take 
Spiccia: The Best Things in Life Are Not Free:  Why Immunity Under Section
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
392 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
tort law claims, the court held that the defendants were immune from 
liability, reasoning that “immunity depends on the source of the 
information in the allegedly tortious statement, not on the source of the 
statement itself.”87  Specifically, the court explained that, although the 
defendants modified the content, a third party was the source of the 
harmful material in the profile; therefore, the defendants could not be 
held liable for merely re-posting the profile elsewhere, as doing so would 
impermissibly treat the ISP as the publisher or speaker of the material.88  
The same holding and reasoning applied to the ISP in Shiamili v. Real 
Estate Group of New York, Inc. despite the fact that the website 
administrator moved a defamatory third-party post from a discussion 
thread to a stand-alone post, added an offensive image and new 
language to the post, and refused to remove the content when asked.89  
                                                                                                             
any steps to verify the accuracy of information posted on the websites and “‘took special 
pains’ to ensure the anonymity” of individuals who posted on the website.  Id. 
87 Id. at 295.  The court further asserted that the mere fact that the defendants knew the 
profile was false and unauthorized when they re-posted it was insufficient to remove 
section 230’s protection.  Id. at 295 n.7. 
88 Id. at 295.  However, the court found that the defendants were not immune from 
liability as to plaintiff’s claims for “infringement of her common-law right to publicity and 
false advertising.”  Id. at 306.  The right to publicity has been defined as “the inherent right 
of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”  Dubnow, supra 
note 21, at 298 (quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity:  A 
Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Additionally, it has been described as “an inherent property right of all individuals.”  Id. 
(quoting Matthew Minora, Comment, Rumor Has It that Non-Celebrity Gossip Web Site 
Operators Are Overestimating Their Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act, 17 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 821, 851 (2009)).  Despite the broad immunity section 230 provides 
for ISPs, Congress did carve out an exception for intellectual property claims, which states 
“[n]othing in [section 230] shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to 
intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006).  But see also Lisa Marie Ross, Note, 
Cyberspace:  The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination—An Analysis of the Conflict Between 
the Communications Decency Act and the Fair Housing Act, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 329, 374 (2009) 
(advocating the removal of this exception to the CDA).  Consequently, plaintiffs have 
sought to place right to publicity claims into section 230’s intellectual property exception; 
however, a uniform consensus has not emerged among courts regarding whether section 
230’s intellectual property exception includes the right of publicity.  Dubnow, supra note 21, 
at 301, 304. 
89 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 1019 (N.Y. 2011).  In Shiamili, the court held that section 230 
precluded liability when a website administrator moved a defamatory comment from a 
discussion thread to a stand-alone post and added an image of Jesus, which was comprised 
of the plaintiff’s face and the words “‘Chris Shiamili:  King of the Token Jews.’”  Id. at 1014.  
The initial comment suggested that Shiamili was racist and anti-semitic and mistreated his 
employees.  Id.  As to the stand-alone post, the administrator gave the post the heading 
“‘Ardor Reality and Those People’” with the subheading, “‘and now it’s time for your weekly 
dose of hate, brought to you unedited, once again, by “Ardor Realty Sucks”. and for the record, we 
are so. not. afraid.”  Id.  Notably, the parties were officers in competing real estate 
companies.  Id.  Subsequent defamatory comments made by anonymous individuals on the 
stand-alone post added to the sting of the initial comment.  Id.  Specifically, some of the 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/9
2013] The Best Things in Life Are Not Free 393 
While the majority of courts, such as the Shiamili court, have followed 
Zeran’s broad interpretation, academic and judicial criticisms may signal 
a new approach to section 230 claims.90 
D. Section 230’s Immunity:  Is It in Jeopardy?   
Although most courts have construed section 230 of the CDA very 
broadly, there have been some cases in which courts have raised 
concerns and attempted to rein in section 230’s immunity.91  For 
example, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook criticized the 
Zeran court’s broad interpretation in both Doe v. GTE and Chicago 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights v. Craigslist, contending that providing 
blanket immunity creates a disincentive because it is easier for ISPs to 
                                                                                                             
additional posts included allegations that the plaintiff was in financial trouble, cheated on 
his wife, and abused his wife.  Id.  After learning of the post, the plaintiff contacted the site 
administrator requesting that he remove the defamatory material; however, he refused to 
do so.  Id.  In response, the plaintiff filed suit against the website for defamation, seeking 
damages and injunctive relief to discontinue publication of the material.  Id. at 1014–15.  As 
to the defendants’ act of moving the comment to a stand-alone post, the court explained 
that such an act does not result in forfeiture of immunity because reposting third-party 
content falls within a publisher’s traditional editorial functions.  Id. at 1019.  Regarding the 
rest of the post, the court recognized that, although the defendants were content providers 
with respect to development of the heading, subheading, and illustration, such material did 
not materially contribute to the defamatory nature of the original comment because “no 
‘reasonable reader could have concluded that [it was] conveying facts about the plaintiff.’”  
Id. at 1019–20.  The court further explained that the illustration was “obviously satirical.”  
Id. at 1020.  In contrast, Chief Judge Lippman argued in dissent that “a reasonable reader, 
viewing the heading and illustration, might very well have concluded that the site editor 
was endorsing the truth of the appended facts, which asserted that [the] plaintiff was an 
anti-Semite.”  Id. at 1021 (Lippman, J., dissenting).  He further asserted that the defendants’ 
attachment of the illustration alone should have precluded immunity.  Id.  Concerned with 
the majority’s decision, Judge Lippman stated, “[w]hile I do not dispute the adoption of a 
broad approach to immunity for on-line service providers under the CDA, an 
interpretation that immunizes a business’s complicity in defaming a direct competitor takes 
us so far afield from the purpose of the CDA as to make it unrecognizable.”  Id. at 1022. 
90 See infra Part II.D (discussing judicial criticisms and attempts to rein in section 230’s 
broad protection). 
91 See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an ISP forfeits section 230 immunity if it 
materially contributes to the content’s illegality); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights 
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008) (expressing concerns 
about whether section 230 even provides immunity); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 
(7th Cir. 2003) (asserting that Zeran’s broad interpretation appears at odds with Congress’s 
goal of encouraging ISPs to self-regulate); Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 218 (Tex. App. 
2010) (expressing concern regarding the absence of a takedown procedure in section 230); 
see also Ingber, supra note 61, at 425 (asserting that judges are beginning to construe section 
230 more narrowly). 
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take the “do-nothing” approach.92  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit 
refused to grant absolute immunity in Fair Housing Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, reasoning that a website forfeits 
section 230’s protection “if it contributes materially to the alleged 
illegality of the conduct.”93  The court further reasoned that the CDA 
“was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”94  
                                                 
92 Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 670; GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660; see French, supra note 36, at 
454 (asserting that the Seventh Circuit has taken the narrowest view of section 230).  For 
example, in GTE Corp., Judge Easterbrook criticized the broad section 230 interpretation 
from Zeran and its progeny, stating: 
 If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs 
indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit:  
whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take 
precautions, there is no liability under either state or federal law. As 
precautions are costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost revenue 
from the filtered customers, ISPs may be expected to take the do-
nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1).  Yet § 230(c)—
which is, recall, part of the “Communications Decency Act”—bears the 
title “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
offensive material”, hardly an apt description if its principal effect is to 
induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and 
offensive materials via their services. Why should a law designed to 
eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material end up 
defeating claims by the victims of tortious or criminal conduct? 
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660.  Five years later, Judge Easterbrook once again criticized broad 
section 230 interpretations, questioning whether section 230 even grants any type of 
immunity.  See Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 669 (“Subsection (c)(1) does not mention 
‘immunity’ or any synonym.”).  In doing so, he expressly rejected the proposition that 
section 230(c) is a general prohibition against civil liability for ISPs.  Id. 
93 521 F.3d at 1168–69 (“A website operator who edits user-created content—such as by 
correcting spelling, removing obscenity or trimming for length—retains his immunity for 
any illegality in the user-created content, provided that the edits are unrelated to the 
illegality.”).  In Roommates.com, a housing website required subscribers to complete a 
questionnaire that asked, among other things, the subscribers’ sex and sexual orientation, 
as well as whether the subscriber has children.  Id. at 1161.  Roommates.com also required 
subscribers to indicate whether they are willing to live with people of a certain sex, people 
of a particular sexual orientation, or people with children.  Id. at 1165.  Therefore, the San 
Fernando Fair Housing Council filed suit against Roommates.com for violation of the Fair 
Housing Act (“FHA”).  Id. at 1162. 
Section 3604(c) of the FHA makes it unlawful to “make, print, or 
publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, 
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a 
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national 
origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or 
discrimination.” 
Sayler, supra note 72, at 207 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000)).  For an in-depth look into 
how Roommates.com functions as a website, see id. at 205–07. 
94 Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1164 (explaining that, if something is unlawful face-
to-face or by telephone, it does not suddenly become lawful merely because it occurs on the 
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Recognizing that its holding did not comport with the language of its 
previous holding in Carafano, the Ninth Circuit conceded that in Carafano 
it incorrectly suggested that a website may never be liable when a third 
party creates the content at issue.95  In a departure from precedent, the 
court asserted that, when a website materially contributes to the 
illegality, it may still be held liable even if a third party supplies the 
content.96 
Additionally, in Milo v. Martin, the Texas Court of Appeals 
expressed concerns regarding the absence of a takedown procedure 
within section 230, stating: 
We note our concern that section 230 does not provide a 
right to request a website’s owner to remove false and 
defamatory posts placed on a website by third parties, 
and does not provide the injured person with a remedy 
in the event the website’s owner then fails to promptly 
remove defamatory posts from its site, at least in the 
absence of extreme and outrageous circumstances . . . .97  
Similarly, numerous critics have also voiced concerns regarding the 
broad protection section 230 provides, arguing that the statute has failed 
to achieve its main objective because ISPs receive immunity regardless of 
whether they regulate, so they have no incentive to do so.98  Attempting 
                                                                                                             
Internet).  The court declined to decide whether Roommates.com actually violated the 
FHA; however, the court noted that “asking questions certainly can violate the Fair 
Housing Act.”  Id. 
95 Id. at 1171.  The court further explained that “[p]roviding immunity every time a 
website uses data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate the exception to 
section 230 for ‘develop[ing]’ unlawful content ‘in whole or in part.’”  Id. 
96 Id. at 1168.  Since Roommates.com, uncertainty has arisen regarding what constitutes a 
material contribution that would render an ISP an information content provider, resulting 
in forfeiture of section 230 immunity.  See Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 
N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (N.Y. 2011) (“It may be difficult in certain cases to determine whether a 
service provider is also a content provider, particularly since the definition of ‘content 
provider’ is so elastic, and no consensus has emerged concerning what conduct constitutes 
‘development . . . .’”); McBrearty, supra note 36, at 848–52 (discussing the three different 
standards courts have fashioned, which are the essential published content standard, the 
material contribution standard, and the traditional editorial functions standard). 
97 Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 218 (Tex. App. 2010).  Furthermore, in concurrence, 
Justice David Gaultney asserted that, “[a] malicious website operator—one who 
encourages anonymous postings and then intentionally and unreasonably refuses to 
remove a posting known to be defamatory and easily deleted—joins in the activity the 
[CDA] was intended to discourage.”  Id. at 220 (Gaultney, J., concurring). 
98 See, e.g., Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 254 (“[T]he Zeran decision paved the 
way for ISPs, relying upon § 230 as a panacea, to ignore and even facilitate a variety of 
defamatory and sometimes egregious behaviors.”); Gerdes, supra note 37, at 667 
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to address these concerns, academics and courts have made several 
recommendations ranging from self-help remedies to modifications of 
section 230’s statutory language.99 
E. Previously Suggested Remedies   
Some academics and courts have argued that there are several self-
help remedies, such as removal requests, confrontation, and counter 
speech, which online defamation victims can employ to combat material 
posted about them online without judicial or legislative interference.100  
One group of scholars has suggested that the victim contact the ISP and 
request removal of the material at issue, or otherwise, file an injunction 
in court to have the material removed.101  Additionally, the same scholars 
have recommended confronting the individual who posted the material 
at issue and asking the person to stop.102  Last, some academics and 
courts have advocated using counter speech as a remedial measure.103  
                                                                                                             
(“Although Congress’s intent was to remove disincentives to self-regulation by ISPs—by 
encouraging ISPs to edit or post third-party material without fear of being regarded as the 
publisher of the material—§ 230 has failed to provide an incentive for websites to 
regulate.”). 
99 See infra Part II.E (discussing previously proposed remedies to combat the harm from 
third-party posts on the Internet). 
100 See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464 (Del. 2005) (suggesting that the plaintiff reply to 
character attacks to correct the misstatements); Marton et al., supra note 29, at 70, 77–78 
(discussing confrontation and removal requests as possible remedies); Miller, supra note 5, 
at 234–36 (discussing counter speech). 
101 See Marton et al., supra note 29, at 77–79 (discussing removal requests and the 
injunction process).  Similar to the injunction suggestion, an obvious remedy is to pursue 
defamation litigation against the third party; however, such litigation can be very 
expensive and difficult, as the individual is often anonymous.  Bradley A. Areheart, 
Regulating Cyberbullies Through Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 41, 42 
(2007) (explaining that a victim’s pursuit of a legal remedy against the individual 
responsible lacks any likelihood in success, as the user is often impossible to identify and 
judgment-proof, making the high costs of litigation not worth pursuing).  As one 
commentator explained: 
Proof would be next to impossible without a named 
defendant . . . . Thus, plaintiffs face the difficult choice of deciding 
whether the significant front-end litigation costs of an anonymous 
Internet defamation lawsuit are worth the expense, particularly when 
the revelation of the poster’s identity could lead the plaintiff to 
conclude that an actual defamation suit is not worth pursuing. 
Lewis, supra note 28, at 953–54. 
102 See Marton et al., supra note 29, at 70 (discussing confrontation and the goals it can 
accomplish). 
103 See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (discussing self-help remedies and suggesting that the 
plaintiff respond to the defamatory material and set the record straight); Areheart, supra 
note 101, at 42 (contending that responding personally is one option used to confront the 
harassment); Miller, supra note 5, at 234–36 (discussing counter speech as an alternative).  
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The theory behind this particular suggestion is that the best remedy for 
false speech is the truth.104  In addition to self-help remedies, scholars 
have suggested modifying or repealing section 230 altogether.105  
The most common modification to section 230 that academics have 
suggested is the adoption of a notice-and-takedown procedure that is 
almost identical to Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”), which is entitled the Online Copyright Infringement 
Liability Limitation Act (“OCILLA”).106  OCILLA provides that ISPs are 
immune from liability so long as they do not have actual or apparent 
knowledge of the infringing nature of the material; they do not benefit 
financially from the infringing material; and upon notification of claimed 
infringement, they rapidly remove or restrict access to the material.107  
The notification from the alleged copyright holder is required to be 
written and must include the following:  (1) a physical or electronic 
signature of the owner of the copyrighted material or his authorized 
                                                                                                             
Advocates for counter speech suggest that victims respond by posting their side of the 
story in the same place the original allegedly defamatory material was posted. Marton et 
al., supra note 29, at 70.  A similar proposition is an amendment to section 230 that requires 
ISPs to provide a right of reply.  See Michael D. Scott, Would a “Right of Reply” Fix Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act?, 4 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 57, 67–68 (2011–2012) 
(advocating for a right of reply statute and contending that it is more beneficial than a 
notice-and-takedown mechanism because the content at issue will still remain on the 
Internet).  However, it is difficult to predict whether a right of reply statute would be 
upheld in the Internet medium because the Supreme Court has heard two notable right of 
reply cases that produced opposite results.  Compare Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 
418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974) (invalidating a statute that required newspapers to provide 
reply time to election candidates), with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969) 
(upholding an FCC regulation requiring radio stations to provide reply time for 
individuals to answer personal attacks). 
104 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (invalidating the Stolen Valor 
Act, which made lying about receiving the Medal of Honor a punishable crime). 
105 See, e.g., Jeweler, supra note 36, at 20 (advocating for the repeal of section 230 and a 
return to the common law approach to liability for publishers of third-party material); 
Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 263 (proposing an amendment to section 230 that 
provides a notice-and-takedown provision). 
106 See, e.g., David E. Hallett, How to Destroy a Reputation and Get Away With It:  The 
Communication [sic] Decency Act Examined:  Do the Policies and Standards Set Out in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act Provide a Solution for a Person Defamed Online?, 41 IDEA 259, 279 
(2001); Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 263; Alison Virginia King, Note, 
Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws:  Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and 
Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 878 (2010). 
107 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).  In 1998, Congress passed OCILLA in an effort to address 
emerging issues related to attributing liability for copyright infringement on the Internet.  
Lateef Mtima, Whom the Gods Would Destroy:  Why Congress Prioritized Copyright Protection 
Over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 627, 
629, 645–46 (2009) (“The principal purpose of [OCILLA] is to remove the Internet, or 
perhaps more specifically ISPs, from the center of the battle between copyright holders, 
unauthorized file-sharers, and other Internet copyright infringers.”). 
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agent; (2) identification of the allegedly infringing material; (3) the 
location of the material at issue; (4) “information reasonably sufficient to 
permit the [ISP] to contact the complaining party”; (5) a statement that 
the alleged victim of the infringement “has a good faith belief that use of 
the material . . . is not authorized”; and (6) “a statement that the 
information in the notification is accurate, . . . under penalty of 
perjury.”108  Because this solution requires Congressional action to 
amend section 230, some academics have sought to provide other 
solutions that similarly result in removal of the material but can be 
implemented quickly without reliance on Congressional action.109  
For example, one scholar suggested applying an actual malice 
standard of distributor liability to actions involving an ISP’s failure to 
remove unlawful material.110  Specifically, the scholar suggested that 
courts consider factors, such as the Internet forum’s procedure for 
posting comments and the importance of the speech at issue, to 
determine when an actual malice standard should apply.111  If a court 
determines that the actual malice standard is applicable, the plaintiff 
would be required to “show that the operator left the offending 
statement online for an unreasonable length of time after the operator 
knew it was false, or acted in reckless disregard of its falsity.”112  With 
the commonly proposed solutions discussed above, section 230 would 
remain intact; however one academic contends that the best solution is to 
eliminate section 230 entirely.113  Specifically, Matthew Jeweler suggested 
applying the traditional common law framework for publisher liability 
of third-party content, but with a twist—subjecting the ISPs to an 
                                                 
108 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
109 See, e.g., Hyland, supra note 22, at 120 (using the courts’ reasoning in actual malice 
cases to create a viable solution); Miller, supra note 5, at 240–42 (asserting that “any solution 
requiring statutory change requires congressional action—something that is very difficult 
to generate based only on scholarly, legal commentary” and subsequently suggesting 
judicial remedies to avoid reliance on the legislature). 
110 Hyland, supra note 22, at 120.  Actual malice refers to statements made with 
knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for whether they are false.  N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
111 See Hyland, supra note 22, at 121 (explaining types of speech that would trigger the 
actual malice standard).  “Internet commentary about issues of political or social 
importance falls within the stronger levels of constitutional protection and should weigh in 
favor of applying actual malice.”  Id. 
112 Id. at 120–21. 
113 See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 20 (“Congress should repeal the CDA and courts should 
apply the common law framework to Internet defamation cases attempting to hold an ISP 
or website operator liable under a publisher or distributor liability theory.”).  Jeweler 
argued that Congress did not intend to grant ISPs such broad immunity and that, in the 
alternative, even if such was Congress’s intention, section 230’s immunity is no longer 
necessary because Internet has grown immensely into an enormous medium.  Id. at 21. 
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objective “reasonable ISP” standard, in which the ISP will be liable if, 
under the circumstances, it reasonably should have known of the 
defamatory nature of the content.114  
Although section 230 has garnered a great deal of criticism since it 
was passed, it remains the primary source of protection for ISPs today.115  
Despite the numerous proffered solutions for combatting the removal 
issue section 230 has created, none of those suggestions have been 
implemented.116  An analysis of the overall issues, law, and previously 
suggested remedies will shed some light regarding why previous 
suggestions have been unsuccessful in effectuating change and what 
type of remedy would prove most effective moving forward.117 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The proliferation of anonymous defamatory postings on the Internet 
has forced courts and legislatures to engage in the difficult task of 
balancing victims’ reputation rights with the First Amendment rights of 
anonymous posters and the ISPs’ business interests.118  The legislative 
history of the CDA and the judicial construction of the statute indicate, 
however, that courts and legislators have afforded greater weight to the 
anonymous posters and ISPs’ interests than those of the victims.119  
                                                 
114 Id. at 26 (explaining that the reasonable ISP standard will keep ISPs from simply 
ignoring the content to escape distributor liability).  In response to concerns that such a 
standard would chill speech, Jeweler asserted that “not all speech is supposed to go 
unregulated” and that “[d]efamatory speech that injures other individuals’ reputations is 
precisely the type of speech that should be chilled.”  Id. at 28–29.  He further contended that 
the concern that non-defamatory speech will be removed does not justify allowing 
defamatory speech to go unpunished.  Id. at 29. 
115 See, e.g., Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that section 
230 immunized AOL from suit because the plaintiff was alleging, in essence, that AOL 
failed to properly police its network, which involved treating AOL as a speaker of third-
party content); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com., Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(finding a computer match-making service immune under section 230 because it could not 
be liable for false content posted by a third party). 
116 See supra Part II.E (discussing proposed solutions that would help to narrow the broad 
grant of immunity under section 230 since Zeran). 
117 See infra Part III (analyzing section 230’s jurisprudence, contending that section 230 
has failed to achieve Congress’s goals, and evaluating why previously suggested remedies 
do not adequately protect the interests of the victims, ISPs, and individual posters). 
118 See Richards, supra note 14, at 180 (“With the issue of Internet anonymity bubbling up 
in courts and legislatures across the country, a showdown between reputation, privacy, 
and safety interests on the one hand, and the First Amendment rights of message posters 
and online service providers on the other, is inevitable.”); see also Medenica & Wahab, supra 
note 13, at 239 (recognizing that the law has evolved into a “tug-of-war” between the 
various interests at issue). 
119 See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 27–28 (acknowledging that free speech should be 
protected, but arguing that in enacting section 230, Congress impermissibly failed to 
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Today, ISPs have immunity from suit for almost any action taken by a 
third party regardless of the ISPs’ editing and publishing decisions in the 
process, which leaves victims with very limited and often ineffective 
remedies.120  First, Part III.A discusses the errors that have led to the 
exceedingly broad interpretation of section 230.121  Next, Part III.B 
analyzes why previously suggested remedies do not sufficiently balance 
the interests of the victims, ISPs, and third-party posters.122 
A. The Unintended Consequences of the Courts’ Broad Construction of 
Section 230 
Congress enacted section 230 of the CDA to remove the disincentive 
created by the Stratton case and instead provide ISPs with an incentive to 
self-regulate.123  However, the mere fact that Congress removed the 
disincentive does not conversely mean that Congress also created an 
incentive for ISPs to self-regulate.124  Rather, the case law involving 
                                                                                                             
account for an individual’s interest in not being defamed in its quest to preserve free 
speech); Richards, supra note 14, at 198 (“With technological advancements also comes the 
opportunity—indeed the greater likelihood, given the expansive system—for more 
widespread distribution of misinformation, but courts nonetheless often have found that 
the value of allowing such speech outweighs the potential for adverse consequences.”); 
Jameson, supra note 15, at 247 (explaining that on the Internet, an individual’s privacy is 
given less weight than her ability to speak freely).  As Matthew Jeweler correctly argued: 
The conclusion one must draw . . . is that Congress would rather 
promote speech on the Internet than have ISPs and website operators 
be cautious about potentially defamatory speech.  While free speech is 
undoubtedly a matter of great public interest and should be protected, 
Congress should not ignore the compelling competing interest when 
considering this issue:  individuals’ interest in not being defamed. 
Jeweler, supra note 36, at 27. 
120 See Hyland, supra note 22, at 82 (“Victims of egregious defamation have virtually no 
recourse, as the original web publisher is often an anonymous individual that even if 
identified, has few resources to compensate the plaintiff.” (footnote omitted)); Lukmire, 
supra note 48, at 402–03 (providing several obstacles plaintiffs face that make it very 
difficult for them to remedy the situation). 
121 See infra Part III.A (explaining that section 230 has been misinterpreted and fails to 
accomplish Congress’s goal of encouraging ISPs to self-regulate). 
122 See infra Part III.B (evaluating previously suggested remedies and the flaws associated 
with each). 
123 See 141 CONG. REC. H1130 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (“One of the specific purposes of 
this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which 
have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their 
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”); Marshall & David, 
supra note 55, at 78 (explaining that Congress “passed Section 230 in direct response to 
Stratton Oakmont”). 
124 See Hyland, supra note 22, at 113 (“By abolishing distributor liability in most 
jurisdictions, courts have created little incentive for interactive website operators to 
monitor their website content.”); Benedict, supra note 72, at 506 (emphasizing that 
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section 230 indicates that, instead of expending time and money to self-
regulate, many ISPs chose to do nothing while still benefitting from the 
immunity shield that section 230 provides, thereby defeating the primary 
purpose of the statute.125  The discrepancy between the statute’s main 
purposes and its resulting consequences has been heavily criticized by 
scholars and courts alike.126   
1. The Broad Interpretation of Section 230 Is Not Supported by the 
Statute’s Language or Legislative History   
Zeran is the most influential case in section 230’s jurisprudence, as its 
overly broad construction of the statute laid the foundation for needless 
expansive readings of section 230 that have virtually resulted in 
unwarranted blanket immunity for ISPs.127  Despite a lack of support 
                                                                                                             
removing a disincentive is distinct from creating an incentive); see also Quon, supra note 6, 
at 600 (“[T]here is still a strong presence of lewd, offensive, and damaging material online, 
free of any self-filtering efforts exercised by ISPs.”).  As Matthew Jeweler correctly noted: 
Congress has simply assumed that if it immunizes ISPs and website 
operators from liability, then those entities will screen content for 
defamatory material out of their own senses of altruism.  It is 
counterproductive to attempt to encourage these entities to self-
regulate their content for defamatory speech by immunizing them for 
that defamatory speech regardless of whether the ISP attempts whatsoever 
to be responsible and screen its content.  While we would like to think that 
ISPs will screen their own content out of the goodness of their 
corporate hearts, it is a risk that Congress has chosen to take without 
any evidence.  With this choice, Congress has put its faith in ISPs to 
self-regulate and has cut off individuals’ ability to seek redress, 
regardless of whether those ISPs regulate their content. 
Jeweler, supra note 36, at 25–26 (footnote omitted). 
125 See Hyland, supra note 22, at 115 (“[T]he cases that interpret section 230 to immunize 
distributor liability create disincentives to police content.”); Benedict, supra note 72, at 493 
(“The problem is, however, that § 230 does not require self-policing.  These providers can 
reap all of the benefits and are not required to perform any of the service Congress hoped 
to encourage.”); see also, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(providing immunity from tort claims despite the ISP’s failure to remove unlawful material 
when asked); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 295 (D.N.H. 
2008) (immunizing the ISP from a defamation suit when the ISP was asked to remove 
unlawful material and instead, made it even more apparent); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of 
N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that section 230 barred suit against a 
website operator for alleged defamatory statements made on the website by a third party). 
126 See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that section 
230 induces ISPs to take the “do nothing” approach, as precautions are costly and ISPs are 
immune regardless of whether they self-regulate); Dickinson, supra note 44, at 870 (“The 
majority view reads subsection (c)(2) entirely out of the text and in the process renders the 
Section powerless to achieve its stated objective—encouragement of self-censorship.”). 
127 Lukmire, supra note 48, at 385; see Materna, supra note 51, at 115 (asserting that Zeran’s 
rationale created a “slippery slope” because subsequent courts relied on Zeran as precedent 
and extended section 230 immunity to completely unrelated facts, broadening the statute’s 
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from the statute’s language or its legislative history, the court in Zeran 
bestowed immunity on ISPs for torts other than defamation and broke 
away from a long-standing common law tradition, eliminating 
distributor liability on the Internet completely.128  Section 230 only 
references protection from publisher liability, which suggests that 
Congress did not intend to immunize ISPs from distributor liability.129  
Presumably, Congress was well aware of the different common law 
standards involved in defamation suits; therefore, Congress’s inclusion 
of publisher liability and failure to address distributor liability in section 
                                                                                                             
scope); Ingber, supra note 61, at 429 (“Courts have consistently held, in a variety of contexts, 
that Section 230 provides a broad and sweeping immunity to ISPs faced with civil liability 
claims.”); Sayler, supra note 72, at 210 (explaining that section 230’s broad language has 
provided courts with flexibility in interpreting the Act, and courts have typically erred on 
the side of granting ISPs protection). 
128 Lukmire, supra note 48, at 385; see Ottenweller, supra note 5, at 1312 (“[T]he Zeran 
majority abandoned well-settled principles of common law defamation and led subsequent 
courts down their misguided path.”).  Two academics have argued that the Zeran court 
erred in “assum[ing] that a mere accusation would be sufficient to trigger ISP liability” 
because tort law merely compels that a distributor exercise reasonable precautions.  
Lichtman & Posner, supra note 55, at 252–53. 
129 Sheridan, supra note 34, at 168; see Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 251 
(“Noticeably absent from § 230(c)(1) is an express mention of distributor protection.  
Rather, the section sets forth protection only for ‘publishers or speakers’ of content.”).  As 
one commentator explained: 
Nothing in the language of the statute suggests immunization from 
distributor liability as well, otherwise Congress would not have 
included “publisher or speaker” in the statute.  Further, it would make 
little sense for Congress to pass an act promoting decency on the 
Internet by encouraging ISP self-policing efforts if an ISP could instead 
choose to do no self-policing when notified of harmful content and 
remain free of liability.  Instead, the more likely intent of Congress was 
to immunize ISPs that actively review and edit inappropriate content 
while leaving others vulnerable to lawsuits if they “do not screen any 
third-party content whatsoever.” 
Lewis, supra note 28, at 959 (footnotes omitted).  Similarly, another critic persuasively 
argued that: 
the placement of “speaker” alongside “publisher” suggests that 
Congress meant for the statute to eliminate only primary publisher 
liability for ISPs, but to keep distributor liability intact.  Otherwise, 
Congress would have also stated that ISPs should not be treated as 
distributors in order to cover all relevant forms of defamation liability. 
Ottenweller, supra note 5, at 1316 (footnote omitted).  The maxim expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius also supports a conclusion that section 230 does not apply to distributor liability 
because the terms publisher and speaker were both expressly stated and distributor was 
not, which implies that distributors are excluded from section 230’s protection.  See supra 
note 44 (explaining that expressio unius est exclusio alterius stands for the proposition that 
expression of particular terms implies inapplicability of excluded terms). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/9
2013] The Best Things in Life Are Not Free 403 
230 does not appear to be accidental.130  Yet, the court in Zeran wrongly 
concluded that ISPs were protected from distributor liability despite 
Congress’s silence on that issue.131  The Zeran court reasoned that 
distributor liability was a mere subset of publisher liability; however, 
such a conclusion is at odds with the common law custom of 
maintaining a distinction between the two categories.132  
Additionally, the Zeran court incorrectly considered promoting the 
growth of the Internet to be Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the 
statute, failing to recognize that Congress’s primary goal was actually to 
encourage ISPs to self-regulate and remove offensive material.133  Last, 
the rule against surplusage also provides support for the proposition 
that cases further expanding Zeran, such as Batzel and Blumenthal, have 
misconstrued section 230’s language.134  Most courts have interpreted 
                                                 
130 Lee, supra note 57, at 483; see Norby-Jahner, supra note 7, at 251 (“It seems highly 
unlikely that, in light of Congress’s intention to protect children from inappropriate and 
offensive online material and to deter harassing conduct, Congress would intend to 
provide ISPs with immunity if they know about the material and refuse to remove it.”). 
131 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).  See supra Part II.C.2. for an 
in-depth discussion of the Zeran case. 
132 See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 5 (explaining that there are three separate entities at 
common law, each subject to different standards of liability); Gerdes, supra note 37, at 656–
57 (discussing the common law theories of liability and the rationale behind each type).  
See supra Part II.B for an in-depth look at the common law distinction between publisher 
and distributor liability. 
133 Lukmire, supra note 48, at 389 (“[T]he court failed to consider that the end of 
promoting speech on the Internet was arguably subsidiary to, or should at least be 
considered in addition to, section 230’s overall purpose of providing ‘[p]rotection for private 
blocking and screening of offensive material.’”); see supra note 57 and accompanying text 
(explaining that Congress sought to encourage ISPs to self-regulate by removing the 
disincentive created by the Stratton-Cubby paradox).  Others, in accordance with Zeran, 
have also emphasized that Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the statute was to 
promote growth on the Internet.  See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 
2003) (stating that Congress’s first reason for enacting section 230 was to promote 
development of e-commerce and free speech on the Internet).  Additionally, even if 
promoting Internet growth was Congress’s primary goal, section 230 is no longer necessary 
to achieve that goal, as the Internet has grown tremendously and has become “such an 
important part of our society and our everyday life that there is no doubt that it will 
continue to grow and flourish.”  Jeweler, supra note 36, at 37. 
134 See Dickinson, supra note 44, at 869 (criticizing the broad interpretations in Zeran and 
Blumenthal, reasoning that they render subsection (c)(2) unnecessary); see also Ottenweller, 
supra note 5, at 1310–11 (“By misinterpreting the meaning and purpose of the CDA, judicial 
bodies have handed negligent ISPs ‘get out of jail free’ cards . . . .”); Patel, supra note 36, at 
678 (asserting that “absolute immunity . . . is the result of a misinterpretation” of section 
230’s language and Congress’s intent).  According to the rule against surplusage, “if an 
interpretation of given statutory words would produce a meaning that was duplicative of 
other statutory language, it is presumed that this is not the correct interpretation.”  CROSS, 
supra note 44, at 88.  For more information regarding rules of statutory construction, see 
supra note 44. 
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subsection (c)(1) as an immunity provision for any third-party content, 
regardless of the ISPs editing decisions involved.135  However, if ISPs are 
immune for censoring third-party content under subsection (c)(1), then 
there appears to be no purpose in the good faith provision found in 
subsection (c)(2), which independently provides immunity for ISPs that 
censor third-party material.136  Accordingly, Zeran and its progeny 
ultimately expanded the scope of section 230 far beyond what Congress 
actually intended.137 
2. The Lack of Distributor Liability Has Prompted Removal Concerns   
Many courts have followed the Zeran court’s refusal to impose 
distributor liability on ISPs, resulting in ISP immunity in almost every 
case.138  While cases such as Roommates.com offer a glimmer of hope for 
victims, they are very narrow holdings that only apply in rare situations 
when the ISP materially contributes to the illegality of the material.139  
Today, ISPs still enjoy protection in instances where the ISP is asked to 
remove offensive material and refuses to do so, which seems contrary to 
                                                 
135 See, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (providing that editing decisions do not cause ISPs to 
forfeit immunity); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com., Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(asserting that, regardless of the editing decisions involved, an ISP cannot be held liable as 
an information content provider of third-party content); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (stating that 
decisions regarding “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content” fall within 
a publisher’s traditional editorial functions and that section 230 bars lawsuits seeking to 
hold an ISP liable for executing any of those functions). 
136 See Dickinson, supra note 44, at 869 (“If providers who choose to censor third-party-
created content are already immune under subsection (c)(1) because the content is not their 
own, then what can be the purpose of subsection (c)(2), which grants immunity if they 
choose to censor?”); supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing section 230’s 
provisions and Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute). 
137 Jeweler, supra note 36, at 36–37.  “[B]y using the word ‘immunity’ to describe the 
protection from liability § 230 conferred on ISPs, the Zeran court set a dangerous precedent 
that would come to encompass many more internet operators than Congress presumably 
intended to protect.” Zieglowsky, supra note 14, at 1312. 
138 See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (refusing to 
apply liability when an ISP was repeatedly asked to remove unlawful material and failed 
to do so); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 296, 298 (D.N.H. 
2008) (relying on Zeran in its decision to provide immunity from some causes of action to 
an ISP that republished third-party content despite the ISP having knowledge as to the 
unlawful nature of the material); see also Ferris, supra note 37, at 130 (“Most courts around 
the country have followed the Zeran analysis to the letter.”). 
139 See Adamo, supra note 43, at 11–12 (contending that Roommates.com was not a 
substantial change to the law concerning section 230).  Specifically, Roommates.com has been 
described as a narrow exception that is only applicable “where the ISP literally forces third 
parties to post illegal content as a condition of using its services.”  Id. at 11. 
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Congress’s intention.140  Congress explained that it wanted to protect 
self-regulating “Good Samaritans” in passing section 230.141  However, 
the law as it stands today protects not only self-regulating Good 
Samaritans, but also those ISPs that refuse to self-regulate; therefore, no 
incentive exists for ISPs to behave like the Good Samaritans Congress 
sought to protect when it passed the statute.142  Several cases, such as 
Barnes, Friendfinder, and Shiamili, illustrate that, when asked to remove 
allegedly illegal content, ISPs often refuse to do so or ignore the requests 
altogether.143  In so doing, these ISPs join in the activity that section 230 
was intended to discourage.144  
The ISP’s failure to remove the content in Friendfinder suggests that 
bad faith may have been at play.  In Friendfinder, the plaintiff informed 
the website that a profile claiming to be her was actually not hers and 
requested its removal; yet, the ISP chose to make the profile appear as 
teasers in areas outside its actual webpage, making the content even more 
apparent.145  As Justice Gaultney explained in Milo v. Martin, bad faith 
conduct should not be worthy of section 230 immunity because the 
                                                 
140 See, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098, 1103; Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 292, 298; 
Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 1020 (N.Y. 2011); see also 
supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress intended to encourage ISPs 
to remove unlawful material from the Internet). 
141 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
142 Ottenweller, supra note 5, at 1320 (“Because the ISPs have no threat or fear of litigation 
for defamatory materials posted by third parties, there no longer remains an incentive for 
providers to screen for offensive and harmful material and the ISP is free to use its 
resources on other profitable ventures.”); Patel, supra note 36, at 684 (“Common sense 
dictates that an ISP will not waste its time and money monitoring content over the Internet 
when it will suffer no repercussions from failing to do so.”); Quon, supra note 6, at 590 
(asserting that section 230’s immunity does not provide an “incentive for . . . ISPs to self-
regulate the appropriateness of the content posted” on their websites; therefore, the sites 
are “blank canvases readily available for the actual parties to directly furnish inappropriate 
material online”). 
143 See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098, 1103 (providing section 230 immunity to an ISP that was 
repeatedly asked to remove unlawful material and failed to do so); Friendfinder, 540 F. 
Supp. 2d at 292, 298 (allowing section 230 immunity when a plaintiff sought to hold a 
website liable as a publisher of third-party information, even though plaintiff requested 
that the website remove the content); Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1014, 1020 (holding that an ISP 
was immune from suit, despite its refusal to remove knowingly defamatory material when 
asked); see also supra Part II.C.2 (providing the background of each case and the removal 
issues involved). 
144 Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 220 (Tex. App. 2010) (Gaultney, J., concurring); see 
supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that Congress enacted section 230 to encourage ISPs to self-
regulate by removing then-existing disincentives). 
145 Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 292.  See supra Part II.C.2 for a more in-depth 
discussion of the Friendfinder case. 
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provision was intended for Good Samaritan ISPs.146  Yet, the law as it 
stands does not differentiate between good and bad faith for purposes of 
immunity evaluations; therefore, ISPs, such as the one in Friendfinder, are 
able to act in bad faith while still reaping the benefits of section 230’s 
immunity shield.147  Meanwhile, victims of online defamation are left to 
expend time and money litigating the matter with great uncertainty 
while their reputations rapidly deteriorate.148 
B. The Ineffectiveness of Previously Suggested Remedies   
Although critics have recommended using self-help remedies to 
mitigate the harmful effects of defamatory speech, such remedies are 
often ineffective.149  As illustrated in the case law concerning the CDA, 
contacting the ISP and requesting removal of the material often does not 
work because ISPs know that they are not required to do so by law.150  
Confrontation, while easy and inexpensive, often does not stop the 
publications when the individual is anonymous, which is often the 
case.151  Furthermore, even if confrontation successfully stops the 
publication of further defamatory statements, it does not necessarily 
                                                 
146 311 S.W.3d at 221 (Gaultney J., concurring) (arguing that section 230’s language 
indicates that bad faith conduct is not afforded protection by the Act).  “By its terms, 
section 230(c)(2)(A) protects an action taken in ‘good faith’—that is, with an absence of 
malice.  A provider that acts maliciously, and that would be held civilly liable under state 
law, does not enjoy federal immunity under section 230(c)(2)(A).”  Id.  Justice Gaultney 
asserted that section 230 was intended to protect good faith efforts to remove third-party 
defamatory statements, even if such efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful.  Id.  
Furthermore, Justice Gaultney contended that “a malicious provider who intentionally and 
unreasonably chooses not to remove material that can easily be deleted, and that is known 
to be defamatory, should not be immune from civil liability under section 230(c)(2)(A).”  Id. 
147 See Benedict, supra note 72, at 493 (“The problem is, however, that § 230 does not 
require self-policing.  These providers can reap all of the benefits and are not required to 
perform any of the service Congress hoped to encourage.”). 
148 See Miller, supra note 5, at 250 (discussing the difficulties involved with John Doe suits 
seeking to compel ISPs to disclose identities); Sheridan, supra note 34, at 178 (recognizing 
that litigation is expensive); see also Lipton, supra note 3, at 1131 (explaining that, even if the 
plaintiff is able to compel disclosure, the third-party poster is typically unable to satisfy a 
judgment). 
149 See Miller, supra note 5, at 236 (“[S]elf-help has not been a sufficient deterrent to stop 
defamatory posts.”). 
150 See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009); Friendfinder, 
540 F. Supp. 2d at 292, 298; Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 
(N.Y. 2011). 
151 See Areheart, supra note 101, at 42 (explaining that the individual posters are often 
anonymous and difficult to track down); Marton et al., supra note 29, at 70 (asserting that 
confrontation is the easiest and least expensive remedy). 
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result in removal of the existing material to spare the victim’s 
reputation.152  
Another suggested remedy is counter speech.153  However, once the 
lie is available to the public, the mere fact that a victim replies to a 
defamatory thread saying “that is false” does not guarantee that 
everyone—or anyone for that matter—will believe the victim.154  In fact, 
counter speech can and frequently does fuel even more defamatory 
discussion.155  Moreover, counter speech alone does not stop the 
defamatory material from appearing on search engine sites when 
someone searches the victim’s name; therefore, the victim’s reputation 
still remains in jeopardy even when the victim uses counter speech.156  
While most victims of online defamation would want to know the 
identity of the anonymous poster, more importantly, victims typically 
want the material removed so as to preserve what is left of their 
reputations and avoid further damage in the future.157  The addition of a 
notice-and-takedown procedure would thus best serve victims’ interests.  
However, the takedown procedure must adequately protect the alleged 
defamer’s First Amendment right to free speech, which is a difficult task 
to achieve.158  
                                                 
152 Marton et al., supra note 29, at 70.  With search engines like Google, victims are 
susceptible to long-term harm if the material is not removed.  See Ciolli, supra note 2, at 154 
(providing an example of a way in which search engines are used to cause harm and 
explaining that prospective employers, friends, and others will have access to the material, 
which can negatively affect individuals in major aspects of their lives). 
153 See Miller, supra note 5, at 236 (discussing whether counter speech is an effective 
remedy). 
154 See Areheart, supra note 101, at 42 (asserting that victims may attempt to respond; 
however, “recent anecdotal evidence . . . suggests this may only make matters worse”); 
Miller, supra note 5, at 236 (contending that counter speech is not effective). 
155 See Miller, supra note 5, at 236 (explaining that the “victim can suffer more damage for 
standing up for himself” because “standing up against a defamer and using online self-
help may generate even more defamatory comments and hostile reactions from others on 
the website or message board”). 
156 See id. (asserting that counter speech is not an effective solution to Internet defamation 
in the “Google era”); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) 
(asserting that counter speech is an inadequate remedy because it does not suffice to undue 
the defamation); Lukmire, supra note 48, at 403 (explaining that counter speech can worsen 
the problem because it may cause the material to be displayed more prominently when the 
individual’s name is searched on Google). 
157 See Lipton, supra note 3, at 1131 (“[T]he plaintiff’s desired remedy will often not be 
damages, but rather an injunction to remove a harmful online posting.”); Marton et al., 
supra note 29, at 69 (“[A] very common goal is a desire to prevent continued publication.”). 
158 See Hyland, supra note 22, at 84 (“An effective solution must consider the serious 
policy implications at stake while remaining consistent with First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  No commentator appears to have crafted a workable solution that relies on 
First Amendment jurisprudence yet also considers the difficult policy issues . . . .”). 
Spiccia: The Best Things in Life Are Not Free:  Why Immunity Under Section
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
408 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
An appealing suggestion that many scholars have offered involves 
the adoption of a notice-and-takedown procedure that is almost identical 
to OCILLA, which is the DMCA’s takedown provision.159  However, 
while some aspects of OCILLA would fit well into section 230—such as 
its detailed notification procedure—others would pose complications 
that cannot be ignored.160  Specifically, removal upon notification alone 
will result in unnecessary censorship if left up to the ISP.161  Even if the 
proposed defamation notice-and-takedown procedure requires ISPs to 
perform a defamation analysis upon notification and thereafter remove 
defamatory material, such a proposal will still be insufficient to protect 
the alleged defamer’s free speech interests.162  Because evaluating the 
validity of a defamation claim is a difficult task and ISPs would be 
immune from suit for removing the material upon notice, ISPs would 
likely seek to avoid the risk of liability by removing everything upon 
notice regardless of whether the content is illegal, thereby chilling free 
speech through excessive self-censorship.163  One of the most 
troublesome aspects of this result is that people could effectively use the 
procedure as a weapon to silence their critics, even if the speech at issue 
would have otherwise received protection.164  
                                                 
159 See, e.g., Hallett, supra note 106, at 279–80; Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 263; 
King, supra note 106, at 878.  For the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown procedure, see supra 
text accompanying notes 107–08. 
160 Adamo, supra note 43, at 39–40. 
161 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining the Zeran court’s concern that 
liability upon notice would chill free speech because ISPs will elect to remove everything 
upon notice, rather than engaging in a defamation analysis).  But see Lichtman & Posner, 
supra note 55, at 252 (asserting that market forces will discipline overzealous ISP behavior 
and “to the extent that any significant externalities remain, tort immunity is not an efficient 
response”). 
162 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[L]iability upon notice 
has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.”); see Areheart, supra note 101, at 44 
(referring to the First Amendment as the “elephant in the room” when considering how to 
regulate the Internet).  See supra Part II.A for information about the First Amendment 
interests involved with Internet defamation. 
163 See Lewis, supra note 28, at 960 (noting that, if an ISP was faced with notice-based 
liability, it would place an ISP in a precarious role because of the difficulty associated with 
determining if a comment is defamatory). 
164 Hyland, supra note 22, at 83.  As one commentator stated: 
If interactive web operators are subject to notice-based liability, they 
may tend to remove any content that is the subject of a complaint, 
thereby pulling some content that is not actually false or defamatory.  
This notice-based liability places great power in the hands of any 
person who becomes the topic of an uncomplimentary Internet 
posting, as a notice to the web operator claiming defamation could 
easily result in the removal of the posting. 
Id.  Similarly, Professor Michael Scott, author of Scott on Information Technology Law, 
emphasized: 
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One scholar has suggested repealing section 230 completely and 
reinstating the three-part common-law framework.165  Similarly, another 
academic recommended maintaining protection for publishers but not 
distributors.166  However, holding ISPs liable for common-law 
distributor liability is problematic because, as with the proposed DMCA-
like takedown procedure, ISPs would likely chill free speech with 
excessive censorship to avoid liability.167  Alternatively, ISPs would 
refrain from monitoring their websites entirely to avoid liability, just as 
the ISP did in Cubby.168  Congress introduced the CDA precisely to 
discourage this hands-off approach to Internet management.169  
Therefore, reinstating the common law framework alone does not 
adequately resolve the overall issues moving forward; rather, it merely 
sets the law back to the problems that existed nearly two decades ago 
when the Stratton and Cubby cases were decided.170  Additionally, 
imposing liability based on what the ISP “should have known” would 
likely require the ISP to filter through all third-party content, which is 
                                                                                                             
a major problem is that the DMCA take-down provisions have been 
abused repeatedly by those who do not like what is being said about 
them online—even when it is true and non-infringing.  The DMCA 
take-down provisions have been used as a means of censoring 
discussion on controversial issues, not just for removal of copyright 
infringing materials. 
Scott, supra note 103, at 66 (footnote omitted). 
165 See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 20 (“Congress should repeal the CDA and courts should 
apply the common law framework to Internet defamation cases attempting to hold an ISP 
or website operator liable under a publisher or distributor liability theory.”). 
166 Ferris, supra note 37, at 134. 
167 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see French, supra note 36, at 475 (“[W]ebsites might choose 
instead to just remove all content that is complained about, without regard to its 
offensiveness or the resulting chilling effect on free speech”).  But see Jeweler, supra note 36, 
at 27 (contending that market forces will prevent ISPs from excessively censoring material).  
As one critic emphasized: 
liability upon notice presents the triple threat of (1) encouraging 
websites to remove any complaint system whereby they might have 
knowledge imputed to them, (2) the unbearable burden of considering 
every complaint received, and (3) the risk that websites will just 
remove all controversial content, thus chilling speech. 
French, supra note 36, at 483. 
168 See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that CompuServe escaped liability because it refrained 
from even attempting to filter content); see also French, supra note 36, at 475 (explaining that 
distributor liability will likely discourage websites from even attempting to become aware 
of the content, and thus websites may refrain from having any system of notification 
whatsoever). 
169 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of section 
230 of the CDA and explaining that Congress sought to encourage ISPs to self-regulate). 
170 See supra Part II.C.1 (providing background facts on the Stratton and Cubby cases and 
the disincentive these decisions created for ISPs to self-regulate). 
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extremely burdensome considering the substantial amount of 
communication that occurs on the Internet today.171  
A more comprehensive approach than those previously suggested is 
necessary to resolve problems involving the absence of an incentive for 
ISPs to remove illegal material.  The solution must encourage ISPs to 
remove illegal material when asked, respect the concerns set out by 
Congress and the judiciary, protect the First Amendment interests of the 
Internet users, and consider the interests and capabilities of the ISPs.172 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Section 230 of the CDA does not adequately protect the interests of 
victims of torts committed on the Internet.173  Additionally, section 230, 
as it stands today, does not achieve Congress’s ultimate goal of 
encouraging ISPs to remove offensive material online because it gives 
ISPs immunity from suit for third-party conduct regardless of whether 
the ISPs remove the material or refuse to do so.174  As a result, when 
victims request removal of defamatory material on the Internet, ISPs 
                                                 
171 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (“In light of the vast amount of speech communicated 
through interactive computer services, these notices could produce an impossible burden 
for service providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing 
controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability.”); French, supra note 36, at 474 
(explaining that, with millions of posts on each website, it is financially burdensome and 
unfeasible to monitor the content); see also Katyal, supra note 70, at 1007–08 (asserting that 
imposing liability on an ISP for its subscribers’ acts will lead the ISP to remove risky 
subscribers from its system). 
172 See supra Part II.A (discussing First Amendment rights, such as the right to remain 
anonymous and speak freely, so long as the speech does not fall within an unprotected 
category, such as defamation); supra Part II.C (explaining that Congress enacted section 230 
primarily to encourage ISPs to self-regulate and to remove the disincentives brought on by 
the Stratton decision); supra Part II.D (discussing concerns expressed by the judiciary 
regarding the absence of a takedown procedure to help victims mitigate harm to their 
reputations and the lack of an incentive for ISPs to self-regulate); supra Part III.B  
(acknowledging concerns regarding the heavy burden some remedies can impose on ISPs 
and recognizing that such burdens can compel ISPs to censor both lawful and unlawful 
speech, which infringes on lawful Internet users’ First Amendment interests). 
173 See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that section 230 has been construed to remove any 
type of notice-based liability and there is no takedown procedure in place, so victims are 
left without a method of removing defamatory material from the Internet to mitigate harm 
to their reputations). 
174 See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that there is no incentive for ISPs to behave like the 
Good Samaritans Congress was concerned about when it enacted section 230 because ISPs 
have immunity irrespective of whether they self-regulate, so there is no reason for them to 
expend resources for self-regulation). 
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often do not remove the material because nothing compels them to do 
so.175  
While scholars have previously suggested repealing or amending 
section 230 to include distributor liability or a takedown procedure, the 
previously requested modifications still fail to adequately protect the 
free speech interests of the anonymous posters and financial interests of 
the ISPs; therefore, the concerns raised in Zeran would still remain.176  
Consequently, this Note proposes a notice-and-takedown provision for 
defamatory material in an effort to more adequately protect:  (1) the 
individual victims’ interests; (2) the ISPs’ interests; and (3) the 
anonymous posters’ right to free speech.177  Rather than leaving the 
defamation analysis in the ISPs’ hands, the FCC should designate a 
division to complete good faith evaluations of the validity of complaints 
from alleged victims and determine whether material complained of 
necessitates removal. 
A. Proposed Legislation 
Section 230A:  Exception to section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act:178  
 
(1) An Internet Service Provider that does not comply with 
the procedure set forth in subsection (2) below forfeits the 
protection of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
and will thus, be subject to liability for third-party content on 
its website or service. 
(2) Notice-and-Takedown Procedure: 
(A) An individual seeking removal of allegedly 
defamatory material on the Internet must send a 
notification that complies with subsection (3) of this Act 
to the Internet Service Provider as well as the Federal 
Communications Commission requesting such removal. 
(B) The Internet Service Provider, upon receipt of the 
removal notification, must promptly notify the third-
party poster that: 
                                                 
175 See supra Part II.C.2 (examining cases in which victims repeatedly requested the 
removal of unlawful material and the ISPs refused to do so). 
176 See supra Part III.B (discussing previously suggested remedies and why they are 
ineffective). 
177 See supra text accompanying note 172 (explaining the various competing interests 
involved). 
178 This proposed legislation adds another subsection to section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act.  The language of subsection (3)(A) is based off the DMCA’s 
notice procedure; however, the author created the remaining subsections. 
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(i) The Federal Communications Commission is 
evaluating the allegedly defamatory content; 
(ii) The agency may require removal of the material; 
(iii)  The poster’s identity has not been and will not 
thereafter be disclosed; and 
(iv) The poster, within one (1) week, may provide the 
Federal Communications Commission with proof of 
the truthfulness of the speech, if available. 
(C) The Federal Communications Commission, upon 
receipt of the removal notification, must promptly contact 
the complaining party to notify him or her that the matter 
is under advisement. 
(D) The Federal Communications Commission must, 
within sixty (60) days, conduct a good faith evaluation of 
the requesting party’s claim to determine whether the 
material at issue could reasonably be deemed defamatory. 
(i) If the Federal Communications Commission 
finds that the material at issue could not reasonably 
be deemed defamatory, it must notify the party 
requesting removal that the material will not be 
removed and provide that party with the rationale for 
its decision. 
(ii) If the Federal Communications Commission 
finds that the material at issue could reasonably be 
deemed defamatory, it must contact the Internet 
Service Provider to recommend removal of the 
material. 
(E) Upon receipt of a removal recommendation from the 
Federal Communications Commission, the Internet 
Service Provider must promptly remove the material at 
issue or otherwise forfeit, pursuant to subsction (1), the 
immunity that section 230 provides. 
(3) Elements of Removal Request Notification: 
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification 
requesting removal of third-party material from the 
Internet must include the following: 
(i) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the 
service provider and agency to contact the 
complaining party, such as the complaining party’s 
name, address, telephone number, and, if available, 
an electronic mail address; 
(ii) A copy of the allegedly defamatory material; 
(iii) The precise location of the allegedly defamatory 
material; 
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(iv) A signed statement from the individual 
providing, under penalty of perjury, that the material 
he or she has provided is accurate and that he or she 
reasonably believes the material at issue is 
defamatory; 
(v) Any documentation, if available, that would 
prove the falsity of the material at issue; and 
(vi) Payment of $500.00. 
(B) Failure to comply with the notice requirements set 
forth in subsection (3)(A) will result in automatic denial 
of an individual’s removal request.  
B. Commentary  
First, the alleged victim should send her complaint to the ISP as well 
as the designated FCC division responsible for analyzing defamatory 
content on the Internet.  Once the agency receives the written complaint, 
it must e-mail the complaining party to notify her that the matter is 
under advisement.  Similarly, once the ISP receives the complaint, it 
must notify the poster of the material that a government agency is 
evaluating the content of his speech and that the agency may require 
removal of the material.  In its notification to the poster, the ISP should 
inform him that the ISP has not disclosed his identity and that if he 
wants to fight to keep the material up, he can provide the agency with 
proof of the truthfulness of the speech or argue that the speech is merely 
an opinion, so long as he does so within one week.  If the agency finds 
that the material could not be deemed defamatory, it will e-mail the 
complaining party informing her that it will not request that the ISP 
remove the material and providing a reason for its decision.   
There may be some scenarios where the determination of whether 
material is defamatory is unclear; therefore, if the FCC finds that the 
material could reasonably be deemed defamatory, it must notify the ISP, 
and the ISP must remove the material immediately.  So long as the ISP 
complies with the procedure, it will retain its immunity.  However, if the 
ISP does not comply with the procedure—i.e. refuses to remove the 
material after notification from the agency of the defamatory nature of 
the speech—then it will forfeit its ability to avail itself of section 230’s 
immunity.  Immunity should not be freely given regardless of the ISP’s 
actions; rather, immunity should be earned through compliance with the 
proposed notice-and-takedown procedure.  
The proposed notice-and-takedown procedure is superior to 
previously suggested remedies for several reasons.  First, it provides a 
cost-effective and efficient way for victims to mitigate the damage to 
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their reputations by providing an alternative to costly litigation.  Second, 
by leaving the analysis and decision-making to an impartial government 
agency with knowledge of the law, the alleged defamer’s First 
Amendment rights will receive adequate protection.  This is because the 
FCC will not require that ISPs remove material unless the agency first 
deems the speech defamatory; therefore, ISPs will not feel compelled to 
remove everything upon request from alleged victims.  Third, the 
proposed statute preserves the alleged defamer’s anonymity throughout 
the process, further protecting his First Amendment rights.179  
Specifically, subsections 2(A)–(B) serve, in part, to ensure preservation of 
the alleged defamer’s anonymity by providing a process in which the 
FCC has no direct contact with the anonymous poster and is not 
informed of the individual’s identity.180  Rather, the agency’s interactions 
will be limited solely to the ISP and the complainant.  Fourth, because 
subsection (3)(A)(iv) subjects the complaining party to the possibility of 
perjury charges, there will likely be minimal frivolous complaints.181  
Fifth, the procedure is not overly burdensome to ISPs because it does not 
require that ISPs screen for offensive content or evaluate complaints.  
Last, although the proposed takedown procedure requires government 
interference, the agency is merely an impartial middleman, so the 
government is not overly involved.  
Critics of the proposed notice-and-takedown procedure will likely 
argue that the government cannot afford to allocate time and financial 
resources for the FCC to evaluate potential claims.  However, although 
this is a valid concern, the fee imposed by subsection (3)(A)(vi) seeks to 
alleviate the financial burden on the FCC.182  Notably, it prevents the 
burden from falling on the taxpayers.  Conversely, critics may take issue 
with the imposition of a $500 fee on an innocent victim seeking to have 
the material removed.  An alternative would be a conditional fee, in 
which the FCC would return the $500 if the material complained of 
necessitates removal and would retain the fee if the content at issue does 
not necessitate removal.  One benefit of a conditional fee is that it will 
help to discourage frivolous claims.  However, the conditional fee option 
could cause problems if the agency does not retain enough money to 
                                                 
179 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the First Amendment right to 
publish anonymously). 
180 See supra subsections 2(A)–(B) of the proposed legislation, requiring that the 
anonymous third-party poster receive notice from the ISP rather than the FCC, thus 
ensuring that the FCC is never informed of the individual’s identity. 
181 See supra subsection 3(A)(iv) of the proposed legislation, directing the complaining 
party to sign a statement, under penalty of perjury, indicating the material is defamatory. 
182 See supra subsection (3)(A)(vi) of the proposed notice-and-takedown procedure, 
which imposes a $500 fee on the complaining party. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/9
2013] The Best Things in Life Are Not Free 415 
continue evaluating claims without financial assistance from the 
government.  Additionally, the financial motivation could negatively 
influence removal decisions.  While it is unfortunate that a victim may 
have to pay a fee to have unlawful material removed from the Internet, it 
is important to note that this notice-and-takedown procedure is a more 
cost-effective and reliable alternative to litigation, which is typically 
expensive and risky.183 
V.  CONCLUSION   
Congress enacted section 230 of the CDA primarily to encourage 
ISPs to self-regulate and remove offensive material from the Internet by 
eliminating the disincentives that emerged after the Cubby and Stratton 
cases.184  However, the broad judicial construction of section 230, 
immunizing ISPs from liability for almost all third-party content, has 
prompted the same disincentive Congress sought to eliminate.185  The 
mere fact that Congress eliminated a disincentive does not conversely 
mean that Congress created an incentive.  The evisceration of distributor 
liability on the Internet as well as the lack of procedures or consequences 
for ISP refusal to remove offensive material has left many individuals 
with little or no adequate methods of having the material removed to 
mitigate the damage to their reputations.  The proposed notice-and-
takedown procedure is an effective solution to this problem because it 
finally provides a real incentive for ISPs to remove offensive material, 
yet it also adequately protects the interests of the ISPs and anonymous 
posters.  
Considering the scenario set out in Part I, the law as it stands today 
leaves Barbra with no recourse against JuicyCollegeDirt.com when it 
refuses to remove messages on its website which allege, among other 
things, that Barbra has sexually transmitted diseases and engages in 
sexual misconduct by cheating on her significant other.  This result is 
completely at odds with Congress’s ultimate purpose in enacting section 
230.  An adoption of the proposed notice-and-takedown procedure 
would produce the type of results Congress sought to achieve in 
enacting section 230.  With the proposed notice-and-takedown 
                                                 
183 See supra note 101 (examining the challenges involved in litigation, such as the 
expense, difficulty compelling disclosure of the anonymous individual, and likelihood that 
the defendant will not be able to satisfy the judgment). 
184 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (explaining that Cubby and Stratton 
created a disincentive because taken together, they stood for the proposition that, if ISPs 
attempt to filter content, they will be held liable as publishers). 
185 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (asserting that immunity from suit does not 
encourage ISPs to self-regulate). 
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procedure, Barbra would have a swift and cost-effective process for 
seeking removal of the defamatory material.  
In evaluating the victim’s removal request regarding the 
JuicyCollegeDirt.com postings, the FCC would likely determine that the 
messages—especially those related to criminal acts, sexual misconduct, 
and sexually transmitted diseases—are likely defamatory and 
recommend that JuicyCollegeDirt.com remove the messages promptly.186  
Upon receipt of the FCC’s removal recommendation, 
JuicyCollegeDirt.com would likely remove the messages to ensure that 
the website remains protected from liability for the third-party content.  
If JuicyCollegeDirt.com fails to remove the material or refuses to do so, it 
will be subject to liability as if it had written the defamatory messages 
itself.  Because JuicyCollegeDirt.com has a deeper pocket, it will be a 
lawsuit worth pursuing regardless of the financial obstacles Barbra is 
faced with.  Either way, Barbra will finally have a cost-effective and 
reliable method of repairing the damage to her reputation. 
Patricia Spiccia∗ 
                                                 
186  See supra note 33 (explaining that imputations of criminal or sexual misconduct and 
loathsome disease constitution defamation per se). 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University Law School (2014); B.A., Psychology, Indiana 
University-Bloomington (2011).  First, I would like to thank my parents, Michael and 
Linda, for their unconditional love and support.  Since adopting me from Brazil at the age 
of six, my parents have gone above and beyond to ensure that I receive the best education 
possible.  When I could not speak English, my parents devoted extra time and effort to get 
me up to speed with other children my age.  Without their patience and assistance, I would 
not have become the writer I am today.  I would also like to thank my grandparents, 
Michael and Carmella, for generously helping put me through college.  A special thanks to 
my amazing family and friends who have encouraged me to persevere at times when I felt 
like giving up.  Additionally, I would like to recognize and thank Dean Susan Stuart for her 
constant help and mentorship throughout my years in law school.  Last, I greatly 
appreciate Professor David Myers for engaging in countless thoughtful discussions and 
providing me with invaluable guidance regarding my Note topic. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/9
